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Here there exists no dynasty, no nobility, . . . no bureaucracy
with permanent posts ....
And nevertheless we find here two
great gangs of politicalspeculators, who alternately take possession of state po wer and exploit it. . . and the nation is powerless
against these two great cartels of politicians, who are ostensibly
its servants, but in reality dominate and plunder it.
Friedrich Engels'
INTRODUCTION

Proposals to limit the time individuals may spend in elective
office have surfaced throughout American constitutional history. The
majority of these term limitation proposals have been introduced since
1970.2 They have been largely fueled by the growing perception that
many incumbent politicians have been in office so long they have lost
touch with the people, their thoughts and needs. To those who support
term limits, it seems that, as Engels suggested, public officials have
become a "great cartel" of self-interested careerists rather than public
servants. These officials seem to be controlled by interest groups
whose funding perpetuates them in office; and excessive control by
interest groups in turn taints legislators who, for this reason, appear
corrupt and unaccountable to the people.
These perceptions or attitudes may result from the fact that too
much legislative power, influence, and time is wasted in maintaining
incumbency, and not enough is devoted to developing public policy.
1. KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH ENGELS, WRITINGS ON THE PARIS COMMUNE 32

(1871) (speaking of the corruption inherent in the American political system).

2. AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, LIMITING PRESIDENTIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL TERMS 9 (1979) [hereinafter AMERICAN ENTERPRISE). Senator Gordon Hum-

phrey (R-NH), along with Senator Dennis DeConcini (D-AZ), led the present term
limitation movement in 1990, with the introduction of S. 235, limiting representatives
to six full terms and senators to two terms. DeConcini, who purports to be "deeply
committed to the concept of the citizen legislature" envisioned by the Founding

Fathers, reintroduced the measure in 1991 as S. 12, and again in 1993 as S. 12. See
S.J. Res. 12, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); S.J. Res. 12, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess.

(1991). His professed desire is to reverse the present trend toward a professional
legislature, which "is yet another step away from the democratic ideal, leading toward
rigid, unrepresentative institutions". AMERICAN ENTERPRISE, supra, at 19-20. In the
House, Representatives Bill McCollum (R-FL), Joel Hefley (R-PA), Howard Coble
(R-NC), Richard Schultze (R-PA), and Porter Goss (R-FL) have introduced similar

bills since 1989, none of which received serious consideration. Several of these
mnembers reintroduced bills in 1991. For a list of bills proposed in the 102nd and

103rd Congress, see infra notes 138-143.
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Still, one might assume that the seniority that flows from continuing
incumbency would bring greater practical and substantive experience,
and greater experience should mean greater resources are being brought
to bear in legislating away state or national problems. 3 The dominant
"experience" of most legislators, however, has not been in matters
that develop useful knowledge and skills, but in the continual allconsuming effort to maintain themselves in office. The power of
incumbency is too often used not in the public interest, but in just
the sort of self-serving way the framers feared might result from long
tenure in office, for self-preservation.4 There is insufficient time for
reflection, for setting public policy or meeting public needs. 5
Yet incumbent legislators face such little threat of defeat at the
polls that it is no wonder they have little incentive to meet public
expectations; and there is little probability that individuals more
motivated to do so will replace them. 6 This is due, in large part, to
the far greater fund-raising capacity of incumbents, and their ability
to use official power and perquisites to boost re-election chances.
These advantages are problematic, of course, because official subversion of government resources for the unintended purpose of perpetuating individuals in public office thwarts the fundamental principle
of accountability, 7 and undermines the fairness and openness of
3. The Federalist Robert Livingston, for example, in speaking against legislative rotation requirements at the New York ratifying convention gave early articulation
to this assumption:
the acquisition of abilities is hardly worth the trouble unless one is to enjoy
the satisfaction of employing them for one's country. We all know that
experience is indispensably necessary to good government. Shall we then
drive experience into obscurity? I repeat that this is an absolute abridgement
of the people's rights.
JONATHAN

ELLIOT,

II

THE DEBATES

IN THE SEVERAL

ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION

293 (1941).

STATE CONVENTIONS

ON THE

4. That is, to gain favors or wealth for supportive constituents and to build
alliances with other legislators to generate support for bills that will mutually aid
their re-election efforts. See infra note 36. Incumbents are too infrequently seen
applying the powers of their seniority toward the resolution of seemingly intractable
local and national problems.
5. See, e.g., supra note 7 and accompanying text (polls indicate a lack of
public confidence in legislative effectiveness).
6. Incumbents had a staggering 98.5%o re-election rate in the U.S. House of
Representatives during the 1988 election. The U.S. Senate membership is only slightly
less permanent, with an 80% rate of re-election and both rates have risen steadily in
this century. 136 CONG. REC. S5678, S5679 (daily ed. May 3, 1990) (statement of
Sen. Humphrey). Six measures were introduced in Congress in 1990 to amend the
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elections as effectively as would stuffing ballot boxes.' In either case,
the speech and voting rights of challengers are effectively diluted and
diminished by the lack of government neutrality, 9 i.e., by the absence
of neutral exercises of power by incumbent public office-holders.
Incumbents continue to avail themselves of easy media access, franking privileges, and other quite valuable accoutrements of office or
forms of governmental support in order to maintain incumbency.
Ordinarily, the answer to an ineffective, calcified legislature
would seem to lie in the ordinary political process;' 0 but this requires

United States Constitution to limit terms of congressmen, only to die in committee
with little fanfare, even though a New York Times/CBS poll reported that members
of Congress may be the only demographic group in the country opposed to term
limitations. 136 CONG. REC. S4644 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 1990) (Sen. Humphrey citing
a Gallup poll which found that 70% of House members oppose term limitations,
while a Times/CBS poll detailed the various demographic groups favoring term limits,
showing that support runs across demographic lines). See also Jim Simon, Five Plans
Aim to Clip Longtime Political Wings, THE SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 22, 1991, at B2
(adding the point that the problem is perceived as being worse in the U.S. Congress).
7. "If a government can manipulate [the] marketplace [of ideas], it can
ultimately subvert the process by which the people hold it accountable." Robert D.
Kamenshine, The FirstAmendment's Implied PoliticalEstablishment Clause, 67 CAL.
L. REV. 1104, 1105 (1979) (arguing that the first amendment should be read to imply
a prohibition against political establishment).
8. Id.
9. The government duty to remain neutral in elections was recognized in
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) and United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v.
National Ass'n. of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973). See also Anderson v.
Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983) (holding that the voters' freedom of choice and
association outweigh the state's interest in a deadline and that the "[sitate's important
regulatory interests are generally sufficient [only] to justify reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions.").
10. See, e.g., 137 CONG. REc. S534-35 (daily ed. Jan. 15, 1991) (Sen. Byrd
commenting that people can already limit terms "if they would merely go vote on
election day. If they do not [like] any particular Member," they can vote those
Members out"). See also Ross K. Baker, Limiting Terms is a FormulaFor Disaster
in Congress, NEWSDAY, Jan. 2, 1991, at 87; Alan Lupo, You're Outta Here, BOSTON
GLOBE, Jan. 12, 1991, at 23. Over the years, various commentators have blamed the
failures of the voters to remove incumbents, notwithstanding widespread dissatisfaction over their perceived ineffectiveness, on complacency or ignorance. See 136 CONG.
REc. S4644 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 1990) (Sen. Humphrey citing an article which states
that "voters can't be bothered"). Voters are said to be too busy to be bothered going
to the polls and, if and when they do go, they are said to choose the incumbent
because they choose not to learn about the challengers. Id. The evidence, however,
is otherwise. There is every reason to believe that given a choice of two candidates
who have equal financing and exposure and opposing positions on at least some
important issues, voters will be motivated to participate. The voter turnout in the
1990 Massachusetts election, for example, tends to support this view. In one of the
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opponents sufficiently motivated, financed, and well-known to counter
the enormous advantages of incumbency. These sorts of challengers
are uncommon. Still, many argue that term limitation is too extreme
a solution to this problem, too much of an interference with the rights
of incumbents and their supporters." Instead, campaign reform and
other measures designed to level the playing field are suggested. But
2
reform measures have languished in Congress for several years. They
are introduced, it seems, only to appease the public until the next
election, and those measures that have become law have been significantly hobbled by the courts. Consequently, term limitation provisions are more and more frequently being proposed out of frustration
with the continuing unabated misuse of official power by cavalier
incumbents who are forever raising funds and campaigning for reelection.' 3 Voters in several states have already acted to limit terms of
their own legislators; 4 most state provisions limit the terms of the
State's representatives in Congress as well.' 5 The constitutionality of
the latter provisions is presently under challenge by Rep. Tom Foley,
Speaker of the House, who has been reduced to "lame duck" status
by the recent Washington amendment. 6 Even if state efforts to limit
few state races which not only lacked an incumbent, but where the candidates truly
offered differing views, voter turnout increased dramatically when compared either
to previous Massachusetts elections or other state elections last 'fall. That race drew
7007o of the electorate to the polls, whereas fewer than 60076 of the rest of the nation's
voters felt a similar impulse. Frances C. Whittelsbey, Throw the Rascals (and the
others) Out, NEWSDAY, Jan. 2, 1991, at 85. A study by the Kettering Foundation
also supports the view that Americans are not as apathetic as their voting records
would suggest. Id. The problem, then, is how to control those advantages held by
incumbents which militate against a fair fight on a level playing field.
11. See infra part VIII.B.
12. Failed campaign finance reform bills include S. 2 introduced in 1989, and
in 1990 Senators Byrd, Boren, Ford, and Mitchell introduced S. 137. See infra part
IV. for a discussion of more recent efforts.
13. "The goal of the term limitation movement is .

.

. to replace the career

orientation of office-holders with public service orientation as was the intent of our

founders." Cleta D. Mitchell, Limiting Congressional Terms: A Return to Fundamental Democracy, 12 J.L. & POL. 733, 739 (1991).

14. Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Maine, Michigan, Montana, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota,
Washington and Wyoming have all passed amendments to their state constitutions
limiting terms of office for state legislators.
15. These states are: Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado Florida, Michigan, Montana, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, South Dakota,
Washington and Wyoming. Don T. Debenedictis, Voters Limit Politicians' Terms,
A.B.A. J., Jan. 1993, at 26. See infra part VIII. for a discussion of these term
limitations.
16. In June of 1993, Rep. Foley, of Spokane, Washington, among others, filed
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absolutely federal congressional terms do not meet constitutional
requirements, a periodic rotation scheme, in which a legislator would
step down one out of every four terms, might still be viable.' 7 It

seems clear, in any event, that there will continue to be a growing

movement toward enacting a national constitutional term limitation
amendment, regardless of the success of challenges to local efforts to
limit congressional terms. Meanwhile, the gathering popular support
for amendments which limit terms for state legislators, combined with
the ultimate success of "limited" legislatures in developing social
policy notwithstanding the limits, should lay solid groundwork for

this movement.

After all, the argument is fairly strong that abuses of incumbency
lead to conditions that outweigh the benefits gained by legislative
seniority, i.e., there may in fact be a compelling state interest in
restricting the rights of supporters of incumbents to continue to vote

for them. Simply put, incumbent legislators who are in office too
long can too easily undermine democracy. They are able to marshall
state power and resources in a way that restrains the voting rights of

suit challenging a measure passed in the previous election which would limit House
members to three two-year terms and Senators to two terms. See Valerie Richardson,
Foley's Suit to Keep his Job Angers Voters, THE WASH. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1993, at Al.
The amendment would render Foley, who has been a member of the House for
thirty-two years, ineligible to run for re-election. The complaint alleged that these
absolute term limitations are pre-empted by the qualifications clause of the U.S.
Constitution, violate the Equal Protection Clause in that they apply only to members
of Congress from 14 states, and are contrary to the First and Fourteenth Amendment
rights of those who would vote for incumbents. Foley also claims to be "directly and
personally harmed" in the exercise of his right to be a candidate. Id. See also
Thorsted v. Eikenberry, No. C92-1763-WD (W.D. Wash. Nov. 16, 1992) (consolidating Foley's suit of June 7, 1993). On February 10, 1994, a United States District
Court held that Washington Initiative 573, which bars the names of encumbents from
the ballot after three terms in the case of House members and two for Senators,
violates Article I, §§ 2 and 3 of the Federal Constitution by imposing an additional
qualification on candidates for office, and violates the first and fourteenth Amendments as well. Thorsted v. Gregoire, 1994 W.L. 37838 (W.D. Wash. 1994). Suits
have also been filed to challenge similar measures recently passed in Florida,
Arkansas, and Nebraska. See Richardson, supra; Susan B. Glasser, Judge Tosses
Arkansas's Term Limits, ROLL CALL, Aug. 2, 1993. In declaring Arkansas's term
limitation amendment unconstitutional, County Circuit Judge Chris Piazza stated
that "[the] amendment is purely and simply a restriction on the qualifications of a
person seeking federal congressional office . . . ." Id.
17. See Neil Gorsuch & Michael Guzman, Will the Gentlemen Please Yield? A
Defense of the Constitutionality of State-Imposed Term Limitations, 20 HOFSTRA L.

341, 354 (1991) (defending the constitutionality of such a modified term
limitation proposal). See also infra notes 212 and 214 (discussing the constitutionality
of absolute Federal Congressional term limits).
REV.
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those who believe that regular rotation in legislative offices is important, i.e., those who prefer to vote for challengers. Hence, state
limitations on federal legislative terms very well might be found
necessary and proper notwithstanding the Fourteenth Amendment or
the federal "qualifications" clause. Equally effective periodic man-'
datory rotation provisions might provide an even stronger case.'
This article surveys the justifications for current efforts to limit
state and federal legislative terms; the historical background for term
limitation; the extent of success of term limitation efforts; and the
arguments over the constitutionality of state constitutional regulation
of state and federal legislative terms. This is followed by a discussion
of the constitutional initiative in Illinois, its origins and intended
purposes, an analysis of the judicial decisions in this area, and the
conclusion that legislative term limitation would seem to be a proper
matter for constitutional initiative in Illinois.' 9
I.

SYSTEM MALFUNCTION

In the early years of the republic, the Anti-Federalists, who
opposed the ratification of the Constitution, 20 advocated limitation of
congressional terms. 2' They argued that American politics would
inevitably become dominated by a professional class of legislators
insulated from public opinion, but this view had been largely rejected
by the Federalists, 22 who thought adequate protection against this
contingency would lie in frequent elections. The Anti-Federalists' fears
at first seemed unfounded. Until the 1890s, the House of Representatives saw a 307o to 60o turnover at each election. 23 In the modern
era, however, the reelection rate for incumbents has averaged more24
than 90o, and approached 100o7o in elections during the late 1980s.
18. See id.

19. ILL. CONST. art. XIV, § 3.
20. HERBERT J. STORING, I THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST: WHAT THE ANTIFEDERALISTS WERE FOR 1-14 (1981).

21. Troy A. Eid & Jim Koble, The New Anti-Federalism: The Constitutionality
DENY. U. L. REV. 1,
15-16 (1992).
22. STORING, supra note 20, at 34. See also Garry Wills, Undemocratic Vistas,
THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS 28-34 (Nov. 19, 1992) (review of GEORGE F. WILL,

of State-Imposed Limits on Congressional Terms of Office, 69

RESTORATION: CONGRESS, TERM LIMITS AND THE RECOVERY OF DELIBERATIVE DEMOC-

RACY (1992).
23. AMERICAN ENTERPRISE, supra note 2, at 8. See also 136 CONG. REC. S4644
(daily ed. Apr. 19, 1990) (statement by Sen. Humphrey). "As late as 1860, the
average length of House service was four years. The number of freshmen in a new
House never dipped below 30o until 1901. In the current House it is 8%." Id.
24. In 1986, 98% of the incumbents running for office were returned to office,
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The shift toward an unassailable incumbency accelerated soon
after the trend during the 1930s and 1940s toward the increasing use
of constituent service, patronage, and "pork-barrel" activities as a
means to ensure reelection. 25 This emerging strategy was fueled by the
explosion in the size and functions of government since the New Deal.
In fact, it is this increased capacity of those in Congress to ingratiate
themselves with voters and consolidate their hold on office through
spending, service, and patronage that is thought responsible for
moving the nation toward the unprecedented 98.5% reelection rate in
the House (and 86% in the Senate) in 1988.26 Yet public confidence
in Congress is at an all time low of 24%.27
a 60o increase since 1950. Mark Tushnet, Judicial Review & Congressional Tenure:
An Observation, 66 TEX. L. REV. 967, 975 (1988) (suggesting an increased judicial
review of legislation may be justified when looking at the true lack of representation
by elected officials). In Lincoln's time, fewer than 2% of the House members served
more than 12 years - members came to Washington for a short stay then returned
"home"; today, 34% have spent more than 12 years in office, and a majority live
permanently in the Washington area once they arrive. Rowland Evans & Robert
Novak, The Best Way to Clean Up Congress, READER'S DIGEST 113 (Mar. 1991).
This is exactly what United States constitutional convention delegate Charles Pinkney
feared would result if legislators were to serve more than four years in office:
members would become entrenched, empowered, and wealthy through their positions
in government. See infra note 123 and accompanying text. Jack Brooks (D-Tx), for
example, with no previous work experience (he has been a politician for forty-two
years), and solely thrQugh wielding his "valuable" seniority-gained influence, has
amassed a fortune worth $2 to $3.5 million. Evans & Novak, supra, at 112. Further,
election studies conclude that incumbents are as secure in their positions as tenured
professors, regardless of their positions on issues and voting records. WILLIAM J.
KEEFE, CONGRESS AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 53 (1980) (noting that there is no excuse
for an incumbent losing). "The congressional system was designed by winners for
the benefit of winners." Id. Illinois legislative incumbents are equally as secure. See,
e.g., Paul M. Green, Illinois is Not a Politically Competitive State, ILLINOIS ISSUES
34-35 (Dec. 1993).
25. For one example, congressional administrative spending has spiraled out of
control, much of it attributable to the cost of retaining power. Says the Wall Street
Journal's John Fund: "It's the most senior members who are most dependent on
staff and lobbyists, not the freshmen." Evans & Novak, supra note 24, at 114.
Indeed, over the past 20 years, as turnover in the legislature has declined, staff size
has doubled to almost 20,000. Id. at 114-15. Therefore, one might expect that term
limitation would save the government money. Moreover, though some fear that term
limits would shift more political power to lobbyists and bureaucrats, the opposite is
probably true: lobbyists might lose power by having to continually re-educate new
legislators. Id. Finally, reasonable "revolving door" legislation might affect an
appropriate compromise on the question of how to avoid the potential conflicts of
interest that might be created by promises of future employment from lobbyists.
26. 136 CONG. REC. S5678-79 (daily ed. May 3, 1990) (statement by Sen.
Humphrey).
27. 137 CONG. REC. HI05 (daily ed. Jan. 9, 1991) (statement by Rep. Wolf).
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This inconsistency can be explained, in part, by the use by
incumbents of the enormous advantages of office to frustrate potential
challengers of merit and vision, leaving the voters only rarely with
viable alternative candidates. 28 In addition, there'is a misguided conventional wisdom at work, one that has been with us since the early
republic; 9 it says that voting incumbents out of office destroys the
benefits gained from their time and experience in office, benefits

which presumably include a wiser and more effective approach to the
problems of the day. But it is not necessarily true that experience in
a legislature produces the wisdom to solve social or economic problems; all that lengthy legislative tenure provides is seniority 0 and the

28. 136 CONG. REC. S4644 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 1990) (statement by Sen.
Humphrey). "Franking privileges, huge staffs, gerry-mandering and unfair campaign
finance laws have combined to give incumbents a grossly unfair advantage." Id. In
1988, 409 incumbents in the House ran for re-election. Five of the six incumbents
defeated had been tainted by scandal. Thus, notwithstanding substantial public
dissatisfaction, exactly one representative was ousted as a consequence of voters
choosing between competing programs and policies articulated in a fair contest for
office. 136 CONG. REC. S5590 (daily ed. May 2, 1990) (statement by Sen. Humphrey).
In 1990, only one senator and 15 House members were defeated. Of those running,
81 members of the House and four senators ran with no major party opponent. 375
representatives and 16 senators - in addition to 90% of state legislators - faced
either no credible opponent "or one so under-financed as to be regarded as out of
contention." Whittelsbey, supra note 10, at 85. "It is not enough, any more, to try
to change campaign finance rules. Even the tightest rules always leave room for
creative loopholes." Id. See also 136 CONG. REC. S 17959-60 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990)
(Sen. Durenberger stating that only one in sixteen incumbents faced any kind of
challenge).
29. See, e.g., supra note 3.
30. The seniority system emerged as a norm in the late 19th century as increasing

numbers of congressional members became career legislators. CHRISTOPHER DEERING
& STEVEN SMITH, COMMITTEES IN *CONGRESS 20-21 (1984); THOMAS MANN & NORMAN
ORNSTEIN, THE NEW CONGRESS 102 (1981). The Senate became the first chamber to
rely on the seniority system in 1846, as rotation and voting for each committee
position became too burdensome. MAURICE TOBIN, HIDDEN POWER 5 (1986). Seniority
became the means of selecting individuals and chairs for committee assignments and
for minimizing conflict among senators. The system was held together by strong
political parties, with assignments made by the Speaker of the House or President
Pro Tem of the Senate, allowing members to advance in their legislative careers.
However, after Speaker Joseph Cannon abused the process in 1910, his power was
revoked, and the House created a Committee on Committees to take over this
function. Id. at 4-5. Soon thereafter, the 17th Amendment was ratified and direct
election of Senators began undermining party strength in the Senate. MANN &
ORNSTEIN, supra, at 103. But while parties began to lose power, committee chairs
gained power and employed the seniority system to select sub-committee chairs and

membership. Lyndon B. Johnson put the first crack in the system in 1953, when as
democratic Senate Leader, he assigned every democratic senator to a major committee
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benefits of increased power the seniority system produces, i.e., a
greater capacity to earn favor with powerful financial and political
supporters.3 The predominant "experience" during the course of a
legislator's tenure in office is raising funds and, as a corollary, the
continual effort to enhance the personal and economic well-being of
useful, powerful, or wealthy constituencies.3 2 This leaves only limited
time for filtering and comprehending the views of constituents and
special pleaders on complex matters, matters which often require
careful study and deliberation; thus, ironically, membership in a
legislature is not the sort of job experience that produces skill in
formulating long-term rational solutions to pressing public concerns
or innovative approaches toward the general welfare. Certainly, being
a good lawmaker requires special competence-an ability to interrogate witnesses, for example, and understand the legislative process
and legislation under consideration-but that sort of competence need
not take years to develop.33 Most legislators are lawyers, so presumably
before any senator could be appointed to a second major committee. TOBIN, supra,
at 6. The next major reform came in 1969, with the revival of the Democratic
Caucus, which began an attack on the system by requiring automatic secret ballot
voting for chairs at the start of each Congress. Id. at 8. The republicans soon
followed suit and, for the first time, it became possible to unseat a chair in favor of
someone with less seniority. Other reforms followed in the 1970's. However, while
the seniority system has been weakened, it is still followed and respected. Id. at 3944. Power is now more diffuse, but this only means that more members have more
staff and budget earlier on in their careers, and those interested in a certain area
tend to remain on that committee, making the committees unrepresentative of the
entire body. MANN & ORNSTEIN, supra, at 108-09. The disadvantages of the system
are that districts with more competitive elections are effectively punished by never
gaining the clout associated with having a senior member; the system ignores the
talents and ability of many members; and chairs have immense national power with
only limited national accountability. Although rotation of chairs might eliminate
much abuse, most members oppose it. ToBiN, supra, at 94-96. For further discussion
of the system, see BARBARA HINKLEY, THE SENIORITY SYSTEM (1971).
31. Leaders of congressional committees, which study proposed legislation and
report their findings and recommendations, are chosen by their political parties. This
process tends to place the most senior members as committee chairs. Although not
as powerful as they once were, these positions still carry great weight in gaining
support for legislation beneficial to the chairman's supporters. See Steven R. Greenberger, Democracy and Congressional Tenure, 41 DEPAUL L. REV. 37, 45-46 (1991)
(describing the development of the "seniority system"); F. Paul Calamita, Solving
Voters' Dilemma: The Case for Legislative Term-Limitation, 8 J.L. & POL. 559, 580
(1992) ("Such a system, where seniority rather than merit determines political clout
in Congress, impedes the election of our ablest citizens to Congress by creating the
perverse incentive to re-elect a mediocre incumbent solely to maintain his or her place
on the seniority ladder.").
32. See, e.g., infra notes 36-37.
33. Whittelsbey, supra note 10 at 85. See also Mitchell, supra note 13, at 741.
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they are already practiced interrogators; and judges are required
regularly to read complex transcripts and make rational decisions
concerning matters about which they have no personal experience. A
conscientious legislator should be capable of no less.34 On the other
hand, legislators who do not at least occasionally live personally
subjected to the laws they have written cannot effectively represent
the long-term needs of constituents or the larger interests of the state
35
or nation as a whole.
In sum, there are two reasons why there is much less turnover in
legislative office then might be expected or desirable. One is that
notwithstanding public perceptions of a lack of efficiency, effective-

ness, or success in national or local legislative efforts, 36 there is, at

the same time, an enormous incentive among narrowly-focused but
powerful "special interests" to maintain these same legislators. Legislative districts with powerful senior incumbents tend to receive more
local economic benefit from programs or institutions brought to the

"In a nation whose educational system can produce individuals capable of creating
and understanding the most complex technologies and aspects of nature in just three
to four years of graduate study, is it really unreasonable to ask Congressman to
figure out government in fewer than twelve years?" Id.
34. See John Hale, Against Successive Terms, NEWSDAY, Jan. 16, 1991, at 94.
"Anyone who can't learn the job adequately in three months is lazy, incompetent,
or both." Id.
35. The fundamental question for the American public, of course, is whether
legislative "effectiveness" means using the seniority system to increase protection,
benefits or profits for "important" home constituencies or, instead, the careful,
deliberate advancement of the general public interest? In reality, a definition of
effectiveness that focuses on the successful exploitation of the seniority system in
order to favor the interests of rich, powerful and influential supporters seems to
predominate today. Obviously, one important assumption of those who advocate
term limitation is that if pretenders to legislative office knew they would only have
that office long enough to learn how to promote the public interest and to stand a
reasonable chance of doing so, they could spend much more time developing and
implementing public policies-most likely in areas where they had some prior
expertise-and much less time maintaining incumbency. See Mitchell, supra note 13,
at 739-40 (explaining that term limitations would attract the "best and brightest"
people, those who are not willing to make a career out of politics just to be effective).
But see Linda Cohen & Matthew Spitzer, Term Limits, 80 GEO. L.J. 477, 496-510
(1992) (the same theory would indicate- that term limits encourage a focus on a
legislator's own interests and those of "special interests" rather than the interests of
constituents).
36. The average tenure of a committee chairman in the House is 26 years, and
in the Senate, 20 years. Yet according to Sen. Gordon Humphrey, "experience has
bred an unresponsive, unrepresentative Congress that busily entrenches itself rather
than reptesents its constituents." 136 CONG. REc. S5030 (daily ed. Apr. 25, 1990)
(statement of Sen. Humphrey).
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district.37 As a result, economic support for challengers, especially
from those who benefit from such programs or institutions, is discouraged. Second, the greater financial resources of incumbents combined with their ability to use the powers of their office to promote
their reelection significantly reduces the ability of challengers to attract
voters. Thus, incumbents stay in office longer and longer, and substantial numbers of voters are faced with the impossible choice of reelecting an incumbent who has the power to accomplish objectives
with which they disagree, or voting for a challenger who will have
little effective power to further the goals they support (assuming the
challenger can get elected at all). It is easy to understand why many
citizens are coming to believe that this situation is an intolerable
distortion of representative democracy.
II. THE INCUMBENT FOOTHOLD: ABUSE OF POWER?
Government should reflect and fairly represent those in the society
it serves. This implies a capacity in the people to elect new governments as new popular majorities coalesce in each generation. The
Supreme Court has held that the freedom to associate with others
"for the common advancement of political beliefs and ideas is a form
of 'orderly group activity' protected by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments," 38 that the "right to vote freely for the candidate of
one's choice is the essence of a democratic society, and that any
restrictions on that right strike at the heart of representative government." 9 When viewed in conjunction with the Equal Protection
Clause, this fundamental right of suffrage means "one person - one
vote", a principle under which each vote must be given the same
weight as all others. 40
However, the iignificant advantage held by incumbents acts
contrary to these principles and distorts the electoral system in their
favor. Incumbents have a superior ability to marshall campaign
finances and thus are able to influence more voters; and opposition
37. "[T]here is ample evidence of the importance of seniority to successfully
steering federal money and projects into members districts or states." Joshua Levy,
Can They Throw the Bums Out? The Constitutionality of State-Imposed Congressional Term Limits, 80 GEO. L.J. 1913, 1919 (1992).
38. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 356 (1976) (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371
U.S. 415, 430 (1963); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 522-23 (1960); and NAACP
v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958)).
39. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964).
40. "The conception of political equality from the Declaration of Independence,
to Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth
Amendments can only mean one thing ...
Gray v. Sander, 372 U.S. 368, 379-80
(1963).
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votes (votes for "change") are dissipated or diluted when the structure
and official power of government itself are used to advance the cause
of the incumbent candidate. Indeed, state action which favors or
subsidizes incumbency effectively violates the First Amendment rights
of those taxpayers who would choose the challenger. 4 1 Utilization of
public funds and employees in support of an incumbent's campaign
distorts election results, effectively adding votes to the incumbent's
side; 42 it causes the government to "speak only on one side," thus
discriminating against opposing views.4 3 Infringement of political expression and association occurs whenever an incumbent uses government resources, official power, or a greater fund-raising capacity to
sway voters who might otherwise support the challenger."4

41. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 26 (1968) (holding that a state law which
effectively precluded independent candidates violated the voters First Amendment
right of association). Thomas Jefferson said that "to compel a man to furnish
contributions of money for the propagation of opinions for which he disbelieves is
sinful and tyrannical." Erwin Chemerinsky, Protecting the Democratic Process: Voter
Standing to Challenge Abuses of Incumbency, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 773, 789 n. 140 (1988)
(citing IRVING BRANT, JAMES MADISON, THE NATIONALIST 354 (1948)).
42. Williams, 393 U.S. at 23. For example, in White v. Snear, 313 F. Supp.
1100 (E.D. Pa. 1970), plaintiffs gained standing by alleging that their voting rights

were infringed under the First and Fourteenth Amendments where county commissioners were accused of documenting employees as working but giving them the day
off to perform campaign tasks for incumbent candidates. These employees were
"encouraged" to contribute funds to the endorsed candidates and were required to
aid those candidates at the polls on election day. Thus, the taxpayers paid for partisan
work rather than county business, and the state effectively subsidized the incumbent's
campaigns because the weight of government power was "brought to bear directly
to effect the outcome of an election". Id. at 1103. By disadvantaging all challenging
candidates in this way, the Commissioners violated the Equal Protection Clause. Id.
at 1104.
43. Chemerinsky, supra note 41, at 790.
44. James A. Gardner, The Uses and Abuses of Incumbency: People v.
Ohrenstein and the Limits of Inherent Legislative Power, 60 FORDHAM L. REVIEW

217, 224 (1991):
When the government uses its powers to improve or obstruct the fortunes
of particular candidates, it deprives the people of the free choice among
candidates that belongs to them alone. Such actions by the government
introduce an element of nonconsensual rule-of despotism-into the system
of self-rule inherent in republican democracy.
Id. See also Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 356 (1976) (free political association

cannot be denied "regardless of the nature of the inducement"); NAACP v. Alabama,
357 U.S. 449 (1958) (Government action which impedes one's right to freely join in
political association weakens the political process and is an unconstitutional interference with freedom of association protected by the First Amendment.).
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A. PATRONAGE, PERQUISITES OF OFFICE, AND SELF-PROMOTION AT
THE TAXPAYER'S EXPENSE.

One of the most powerful tools available to perpetuate incumbents in office is the power of patronage. 45 With the widespread
dependence on government jobs in the United States today, an
incumbent has the ability to deprive any challenger of potential
supporters; individuals forced to compromise their beliefs to retain
public jobs are obviously deterred from associating with their out-ofpower party.4 Justice Brennan, in Elrod v. Burns, 47 examined the
history of political patronage and found that it violates the Constitution in two ways: first, by using government power and resources
to promote a particular political viewpoint, and second, by limiting
an individual's freedom of association. 48 Unfortunately, as was the

45. Though patronage has been with us since the founding of the republic,
Andrew Jackson is widely credited with instituting the "spoils system" in the U.S.
See Cynthia Grant Bowman, We Don't Want Anybody Anybody [sic] Sent: The
Death of PatronageHiring in Chicago, 86 Nw. U.L. REV. 57 (1991). As government
grew, urban "machines" developed to reward political supporters and ensure reelection. Before welfare was instituted, for example, machine workers would provide
essential services and goods to poor constituents in exchange for votes. Id. at 60. In
Chicago, Anton Cermak used patronage to create the Democratic machine credited
with virtually eliminating the Republican party in Chicago after 1933. Id. at 62.
Richard Daley became mayor in 1955 and is said to have personally controlled 35,000
jobs. Id. at 63. He sidestepped civil service regulations, posted jobs only at Democratic
Headquarters, and required that his patronage employees work on election day, help
at fundraisers, and contribute a portion of their salary to the party. Id. at 64. "It is
conservatively estimated that each patronage job resulted in at least six votes." Id.

(citing P. KNAUSS,

CHICAGO:

A

ONE-PARTY STATE

(1972)).

46. See NAACP, 357 U.S. at 460-61. "[F]reedom to engage in association for
the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the 'liberty' assured
by the Due Process Clause . . . ." Id. But patronage forces employees to "furnish
contributions ... for the propagation of opinions" or parties they may not support.
Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234 n.31 (1977) (quoting Thomas
Jefferson).
47. 427 U.S. 347, 351 (1976) (finding that non-civil service employees were
discharged solely because they did not support the Democratic party).
48. Justice Powell, dissenting, argued that these practices did not infringe
significantly enough on First Amendment rights as to outweigh the government
interest in the increased government efficiency resulting from patronage. Elrod v.
Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 382 (1976) (Powell, dissenting). He argued that employees not
aligned with the incumbent party would not have the proper work incentive and that
"patronage hiring practices have contributed to American democracy by stimulating
political activity and by strengthening parties, thereby helping to make government
accountable." Id. Justice Scalia's argument in Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois,
497 U.S. 62 (1990), favored patronage simply because of the long tradition surround-
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case in Elrod, courts traditionally take an approach to First Amendment challenges that requires of them a subjective cost/benefit analysis. The court must factor in personal views and biases concerning
49
the value of such matters as, in this context, the custom of patronage
even though the government interest in continued patronage is, at
best, vague or nonexistent.50 Moreover, the use of such a contrived
ing the practice. Justice Scalia also quoted George Washington Plunkitt, of Tammany
Hall fame, in criticizing civil service because it would make it impossible for parties
to maintain loyalty and organizational accountability. See also Bowman, supra note
45, at 62. However, the majority in Rutan was not persuaded by such arguments
anymore than the majority in Elrod, holding instead that patronage promotes
corruption and inefficiency and weakens the democratic process by entrenching the
power and ideologies of incumbent parties. Id. Politically agreeable employees are
not necessarily efficient; and inefficient employees can always be dismissed. Moreover,
replacing large numbers of public employees after each election is hardly efficient.
Elrod, 427 U.S. at 363 n.18. In reality, patronage employees often are hired for their
ability to deliver votes rather than their qualifications for the job. Id. at 364-65. Nor
is the fact that the government has engaged in a "pernicious practice" since the
earliest days of the Republic relevant to a constitutional attack on that practice.
Rutan, 497 U.S. at 82. "If the age of a pernicious practice were a sufficient reason
for its continued acceptance, the constitutional attack on racial discrimination would,
of course, have been doomed to failure." Id. Justice Stevens pointed out in Rutan
that the patronage "tradition" was only accepted as long as individuals were regarded
as having no right to government employment and the government could place
whatever conditions it desired on the job. Id. at 90-91. But that doctrine had
previously been rejected. Id. See Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972). See

also Peter M. Manikas, Campaign Finance, Public Contracts and Equal Protection,
59 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 817, 836 (1983).

49. This approach constituted the second prong of Brennan's analysis. Elrod,
427 U.S. at 347.

50. See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Patronageand the First Amendment: A Structural

Approach, 56 U. Cm. L. REV. 1369, 1382 (1989) (claiming the government interest
was characterized as "effective government", "efficiency", and "stable political
parties", which are broad and elusive concepts)(quoting, Elrod, 427 U.S. at 364, 379;
and Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 527 (1980)). See also The Supreme Court 1989

Term: Leading Cases: I. Constitutional Law; D. Freedom of Speech, Press, and
Association, 104 HARV. L. REV. 209, 232 (1990) (stating that Justice Scalia, in Elrod,

never explains why or how interests such as "stable parties" and maintenance of
"the two-party system" were legitimate to say nothing of compelling state goals).
For a detailed critique of Justice Scalia's dissent, see generally Bowman, supra note
45 (analyzing whether the "disastrous consequences for our political system" predicted by Scalia as a result of Rutan have come true). The article concludes that
patronage does not increase incentives for political participation, does not lead to
upward mobility for minority groups, and is not central to the party system in
America (i.e. strong parties exist without patronage). See also Brian L. Porto, The

Constitutionand PoliticalPatronage:Supreme Court Jurisprudenceand the Balancing
of First Amendment Freedoms, 13 PACE L. REV. 87, 117 (1993) (arguing that
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balancing test is especially unfortunate since the First Amendment
speaks in absolute terms." Consequently, the decisions following
Elrod have been ambiguous.12 If courts followed Justice Brennan's
structural analysis, they might better ensure that democratic process
is not subverted by government practices which favor one side; the
court would focus not on the relative infringement of rights of
association, but on whether state action adversely affects the electoral
process. 3 Unfortunately, the federal courts have not used this approach.
The Supreme Court, in Williams v. Rhodes,14 first recognized
that running for public office is also a protected right. In spite of
this, however, courts generally do not allow candidates or their
supporters to challenge abuses of incumbency that seriously impede a
challenger's campaign, holding these issues non-justiciable. 5 In 1980,
for example, Senator Edward Kennedy filed suit accusing President
Jimmy Carter of using federal funds to finance his campaign, threatening to fire non-supporters, and using federal grants to coerce state
and local leaders to support his reelection. 6 Kennedy was denied
standing because he was unable to show that these actions were
responsible for his failure to be elected. In other words, he could not
prove he would have been nominated had President Carter not used
government resources to aid his campaign. The Circuit Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia held that Senator Kennedy had
failed to prove the existence of an injury in fact sufficient to satisfy
the standing requirements set forth in Warth v. Seldin.5 7
patronage is sometimes actually a burden to government and that the benefits of
patronage are greatly exaggerated by Justice Scalia).
51. Louis Cammarosano, Application of the First Amendment to Political
Patronage Employment Decisions, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 101, 105 n.52 (contending a
literal reading of the First Amendment would not balance competing interests, a view
which of course has not been adopted by the Court).
52. See, e.g., Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 518 (1980) (the defendant must
show that party affiliation is an "appropriate requirement" for effective performance
of the job in addition to showing that the job is a policy-making position as required
by Elrod). Adding to the confusion, therefore, is the failure of the Court to define
when party affiliation is an "appropriate requirement" for a patronage position.
53. See Bhagwat, supra note 50.
54. 383 U.S. 23 (1968) (upholding a challenge by minority parties in Ohio to
election laws which made it virtually impossible for them to be placed on state
ballots).
55. See generally Chemerinsky, supra note 41. See also Public Citizen, Inc. v.
Simon, 539 F.2d 211 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
56. Winpisinger v. Watson, 628 F.2d 133 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S.
929 (1980).
57. 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (describing the requirements of injury in fact and
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The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in three Illinois cases,"
has also announced that candidates (and voters) have a First Amendment right to be free from official discrimination in elections. In all
three cases, arguably, state power had been used to help incumbents
defeat opponents.19 Government power had also served as leverage to

solicit money from those with interests in obtaining either government

business or favorable legislation; but the Seventh Circuit, by requiring
proof of intentional discrimination against the challenger, practically
foreclosed the possibility of finding "fundraising" activities unconsti-

tutional. 60 The present requirements of law, therefore, force candidates
to prove they would have been nominated or elected but for the
public resources intentionally, unfairly, and overwhelmingly marshalled against them.

redressability in equal protection cases). Many disagree with the courts' reluctance to
adjudicate when there is abuse of political power in elections, especially in light of
the fact that the agency created to enforce election laws has unusually limited power
to curb abuses. Congress has defined "persons" over whom the Federal Elections
Commission (FEC) has jurisdiction to exclude the federal government. 2 U.S.C. §
431(11) (1988). Moreover, the FEC's power is to "conduct investigations and hearings
expeditiously, to encourage voluntary compliance, and to report apparent violations
to appropriate law enforcement authorities." 2 U.S.C. § 437d(a)(9) (1988). Thus, it
lacks authority to restrain even those practices over which it does have jurisdiction.
See also Chemerinsky, supra note 41, at 779-80.
58. Bohus v. Board of Election Comm'rs., 447 F.2d 821 (7th Cir. 1971);
Shakman v. Democratic Org. of Cook County, 435 F.2d 267 (7th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 909 (1971); Weisberg v. Powell, 417 F.2d 388 (7th Cir. 1969). See
also Manikas, supra note 48, at 839-41 (discussing the Shakman, Bohus, and Weisberg
decisions).
59. In Weisberg, the plaintiff claimed that the Illinois Secretary of State
arranged the order of nominating petitions to give candidates endorsed by party
organizations the best places on the ballot. Weisberg, 471 F.2d at 392. The court
used a two part test to analyze the claim: the plaintiff must show both a purposeful
discrimination and that the act in question was a factor in the election outcome. Id.
The plaintiff was successful in establishing both elements. Id. at 391, 392-93. The
Bohus court attempted to distinguish the habitual placement of Democratic candidates
on the top line of the ballot from Weisberg in two ways: the political party with
which each candidate was affiliated was listed, and the number of candidates from
each party was limited to one. Bohus, 447 F.2d at 825. The Bohus plaintiff also
failed to show the ballot placement produced an electoral advantage. Id. The Shakman
court addressed patronage practices among city and county employees of democratic
candidates by holding that: "The interests of candidates in official treatment free
from intentional or purposeful discrimination are entitled to constitutional protection." Shakman, 435 F.2d at 270.
60. "[A]n inquiry into legislative motivation would likely prove fatal to an
attack which alleged that current fundraising practices which favor incumbents are
unconstitutional." Manikas, supra note 48, at 841.
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Such a requirement would seem too severe, however, where a
more reasonable and appropriate standard is available from elsewhere
within the Fourteenth Amendment context'.6 For example, the Court
in Regents of the University of California v. Baake,62 defined the
plaintiff's injury as the denial of an opportunity to be admitted,
rather than a denial of admission. 63 Thus, the injury alleged in
Winpisinger might just as properly have been characterized not as
Kennedy's loss of his party's nomination, but that he was not given
a fair chance to compete for that nomination given the power and
resources of a government which backed President Carter. Using this
standard, if a candidate could show that the extraordinary contributions solicited from those with a special interest in maintaining an
incumbent were a significant factor in the election, she would have
standing to demand relief for the injury to her right to compete fairly
for elective office.6 Of course, at present, without such a standard,
political challengers and their supporters continue to have no significant judicial protection from the advantages of incumbent control
over the government.

61. Although the challenged activity is often political, these activities so clearly
favor incumbents that they could be characterized as violating the equal protection
rights of challengers and their supporters in the same fashion as individual rights of
members of minorities were held impeded in the voting rights cases. Most courts
have agreed that pure patronage firing is inappropriate; they disagree, however, over
the court's role when the act is other than firing, such as hiring, promotion or
transfer. In Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143 (1972), the Court said that the
"rights of voters and the rights of candidates do not lend themselves to easy
separation; laws that affect candidates always have at least some theoretical, correlative effect on voters." However, since then, "candidates' rights" cases have not
established a standard of review under which a candidate may challenge barriers to
his candidacy. See Manikas, supra note 48, at 832-34 (analyzing court cases following
Bullock). "Perhaps the only principle [is] that ballot access rules for independent
candidacies will be upheld unless they are clearly unreasonable and . . . have the
effect of keeping independent candidates off the ballot." Id. at 434.
62. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
63. Id. at 280 n.14. Otherwise, under the standard in Warth v. Seldin, 422
U.S. 490 (1975), Baake may not have had standing based on his failure to be admitted
to school. Justice Powell rejected that argument, however, stating that the injury was
not the plaintiff's failure to be admitted, but the failure of the school to allow him
to compete for all open seats in the class. Id.
64. Manikas, supra note 48, at 851-52. But see Samuel Issacharoff, Judging
Politics: The Elusive Quest for JudicialReview of Political Fairness, 71 TEx. L. REV.
1643, 1675-88 (1993) ("the analytic approach of the equipopulation and minority
vote dilution cases does not 'translate well to claims of political disadvantage in the
electoral arena").
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B. REAPPORTIONMENT

Incumbents also retain power through control over the reapportionment process, which they use to carve out legislative districts in a
way which dilutes the threat of electoral challenge. In 1964, the
Supreme Court held that extreme gerrymandering 65 violated the constitutional principle of "one man, one vote" embodied in the Equal
Protection Clause.6 Baker v. Carr,67 the important early case which
finally made state malapportionment challenges justiciable, was described by former Justice Lewis Powell as "a necessary response to
the manifest distortion of democratic principles practiced by malapportioned legislatures and to abuses of the political system so pervasive
as to undermine the democratic processes." ' 68 The legitimate goal of
reapportionment, then, is to enhance accurate legislative representation by taking into account population shifts. Reapportionment is
mandatory for the United States Congress every ten years as a result
of the Voting Rights Act. 69 However, the result of reapportionment
efforts continues to be the protection of incumbents and political
monopolization. 70 Consequently, the political advantages conferred by
65. This is defined as "[t]he distribution of voters among electoral districts to
perpetuate control by the party in power." Andrew P. Miller & Mark A. Packman,
The Constitutionality of Political Gerrymandering: Davis v. Bandemer and Beyond,
4 J.L. & PoL. 697, 701 (1988).
66. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 578-79 (1964) ("Indiscriminate districting
...may be little more than an open invitation to partisan gerrymandering.").
67. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
68. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 195 n.17 (1974).
69. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 445 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1 (1988)). See generally Daniel R.
Ortiz, Federalism, Reapportionment, and Incumbency: Leading the Legislature to
Police Itself, 4 J.L. & POL. 653 (1988) (discussing the act, its application and
consequences).
70. In Illinois, for example, in 1981, the Democrats won control of the
reapportionment commission which was formed after neither house was willing to
compromise. The resulting map guaranteed that the Democrats would control the
House for a decade, even though a federal court panel ruled that they had intentionally
drawn lines that would minimize the number of black and Hispanic districts. See
Ketchum v. Byrne, 740 F.2d 1398 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1135 (1985).
In 1991, Illinois lost two congressional representatives, so it was assumed that the

party controlling the mapping process that year would be especially powerful. The
Democratically-controlled Illinois House and Senate passed a redistricting plan, but
it was vetoed by Republican Governor Edgar on the last day of the legislative session.
The redistricting commission received three plans, including the one vetoed by the
Governor. With no signs of any willingness to compromise, the commission, comprised of eight members divided equally by party, became deadlocked. The Republi-
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incumbents upon themselves in the course of reapportionment would
seem to impair fair and equal representation."
Political monopolies, as is the case with economic monopolies,
create exclusive control through barriers raised to prevent competitors
from entering the marketplace; but while consumer preferences are
not usually imposed on every consumer, the voting process does
impose the aggregate of individual choices on all voters. Uncompetitive districts effectively disenfranchise minority voters (that is, voters
for "change") and clearly weaken democracy by perpetually contravening the desires and interests of those voters. Studies done after the
1980 congressional reapportionment, for example, reveal that turnover
rates, along with overall competitiveness of congressional seats, de72
clined immediately afterward.
In Reynolds v. Sims," however, the notion of "one man, one
vote" was held to mean not just fair and equal access to the polls,
but the right not to have one's vote officially grouped geographically
with others in a way designed to minimize its influence. The effective
dilution of voting power based on one's residence was held to violate
the Fourteenth Amendment just as much as invidious discrimination
based on race.7 4 Nevertheless, while the Reynolds Court affirmed the
duty of the courts to intervene to protect fair and democratic elections

(impliedly, from official practices that support incumbency), 75 courts

continued to give legislatures vast latitude to remap districts. This is
due, primarily, to the complexity and local political nature of the
issue, a natural outcome of a situation where state districting schemes
have never been completely population-based. Nevertheless, the concans won the draw required to select a ninth member in the event of deadlock, and
the commission filed with the Secretary of State as the "official" redistricting the
Republican-sponsored map, which not only gave their incumbents more secure seats,

but gave their partisans an opportunity to win at least 32 of the 59 state Senate seats
and take control of the upper chamber after more than a decade of Democratic
control. Kathleen Best & Daniel R. Browning, GOP Plan on Remap Disclosed, ST.

Oct. 2, 1991, at 12A. The map "could also return control of
the Illinois House to the GOP by giving Republicans an opportunity to win as many
as 62 of the House's 118 seats." Id.
LouIs POST-DISPATCH,

71. Ketchum, 740 F.2d at 1402 n.2.

72. An interesting study of post 1980 reapportionment also found that legislators involved in the process were 1 1/2 times more likely to pursue protection of

incumbents than to seek party advantage, and that political advantages gained in the
process were not gained by the state legislators who did the reapportionment, but by

the incumbent members of the federal congress. See Ortiz, supra note 69, at 680.
73. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
74. Reynold v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964). See also supra note 62.

75. Reynold, 377 U.S. at 566.
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tinuing importance of gerrymandering as a means of perpetuating
incumbency cannot be minimized.
III.

CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM?

Campaign finance reform is most often thought of as the solution
to an entrenched and unresponsive Congress. Unfortunately, it has
not succeeded in significantly opening up the electoral process. Each
new reform tends to create new problems 7 6 and is often little more

than a superficial, symbolic effort to placate the public. Both politicians and interest groups circumvent individual contribution limits

through loopholes that are ultimately sustained by the federal courts. 77
Despite public pressure for immediate action, Congress has spent
several years contemplating further reforms, and has only recently
agreed on a reform measure; 71 this measure, however, is not one

which will necessarily eradicate the acknowledged abuses. 79

76. See Kenneth A. Gross, The Enforcement of Campaign Finance Rules: A
System in Search of Reform, 9 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 279, 280-83 (1991) (discussing
the failures of past campaign reform legislation).
77. In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), the Supreme Court upheld
provisions limiting individual contributions to candidates. However, it held restrictions on contributions from Political Action Committees (PACs) unconstitutional
because such restrictions would restrain political dialogue contrary to the First
Amendment. Id. at 43. This holding ignores the fact that meaningful campaign
finance reform is made much more difficult without PAC restrictions because PAC
influence is a significant part of the problem. See James C. Otteson, A Constitutional
Analysis of Congressional Term Limits: Improving Representative Legislation Under
the Constitution, 41 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 19-20 (1991):
PACs are one of the major reasons why House incumbents in 1990 were
able to raise an average of $385,000 to their challenger's $83,000, an average
of more than 4.5-to-I. Thus, meaningful campaign finance laws should
include a way to either eliminate PACs or to regulate them closely.
Although limits on individual contributions might also decrease the quantity of
political expression, this was held necessary to further the state's compelling interest
in combatting "quid pro quo" corruption of incumbents. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 29.
78. "Ignoring scandals and public disgust at corrupt and distracting campaign
fund raising, Republicans have blocked meaningful change since 1974. The Senate
majority leader, George Mitchell, deserves credit for breaking this gridlock with a
difficult victory that keeps reform alive." Campaign Finance Reform: Alive, N.Y.
TIMEs, June 19, 1993, § 1, at 20. See also S.3, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
79. See 137 CONG. REC. S534 (daily ed. Jan. 15, 1991) (Sen. Byrd). The two
chambers could not agree on campaign finance reform in 1990. For example, in the
100th Congress Sens. Byrd and Boren introduced S.2., which was subsequently
withdrawn. Campaign finance reform was introduced again in the 101st Congress
but it was destined to perish by the end of that Congress. Id. In 1991, H.R. 329 and
S.3. provided for voluntary spending limits and some measure of public financing.
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The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1974 (FECA), 0 passed in
response to abuses of office which preceded Watergate, is just one
example of the inadequacy of legislation. Congress proceeded under

the assumption that campaign finance reform must necessarily focus
on controlling contributions since, as contributions fall, so too will
spending for (and the bias toward) incumbents." In order to reduce
the influence of wealthy individuals,8 2 FECA limited the amounts of
money an individual could contribute to candidates, but allowed small
benefactors to contribute large amounts as a group, ostensibly to
encourage broader participation by the middle class. As a result,
FECA encouraged the growth of so-called Political Action Committees (PACs) which could contribute five times more than an individ-

ual.

3

PACs now dominate the present political process and are

overwhelmingly supportive of incumbents.1 4 Moreover, even though

On a Senate vote, all Democrats supported public financing, while all Republicans
were against it. See 137 CoNG. REc. S6478 (May 23, 1991) (statement by Sen.
McConnell). In 1993, Sens Boren, Bryan, Deconcini and Lautenberg introduced S.3
in an apparently never-ending battle to reform Campaign financing. Although the
Senate passed S.3, "to win . . . support, Mr. Mitchell and the bill's chief Senate

sponsor, David Boren of Oklahoma, had to agree to a devilish bargain, striking the
bill's publicly financed communication vouchers." Campaign Finance Reform: Alive,
N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 1993, § 1, at 20. However, "[tihere's still much in the bill to
like. Its spending limits and curbs on political action committees would greatly reduce
the financial advantage that incumbents now enjoy over challengers, and eliminate
millions in favor seeking dollars from the system." Id.
80. P.L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (1974).
81. Congress' concern over the corrupting influence of money took the form
of mandatory disclosure of campaign financial activity. 2 U.S.C. §§ 432-434 (1988).
Further restrictions were designed to reduce campaign spending and place limits on
what candidates could receive and spend, with the intent of equalizing spending
among candidates. 2 U.S.C. § 441a (1988).
82. See FECA Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, § 101(b), 88 Stat.
1264 (1974).
83. Lawton Chiles, PACS: Congress on the Auction Block, II J.LEGIS. 193,
206-08 (1984).

84. Id. For example, the 1990 Almanac of American Politics reported that
House incumbents received 800% more in PAC donations in 1988 than their
challengers. Whittelsbey, supra note 10, at 85 (Senate incumbents received 350%

more than their challengers). In the 1990 elections, Senate incumbents had a 3.5 to
I advantage in PAC money, House incumbents had a 11.5 to 1 advantage. Levy,
supra note 37, at 1916 n.18. "[In] the first 18 months of the 1992 election cycle;
$103 million has been donated by political action committees to candidates; 90 percent
of that, over $90 million, has gone to incumbents." 138 CONG. REc. H10655 (daily
ed. Oct. 2, 1992) (statement by Rep. Mazzoli). In 1992, "93 percent of the incumbents
running for office were reelected. Senate incumbents were able to outspend challengers
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FECA attempted to control campaign spending, it continued to allow

the use of resources for members' franking privileges equal to almost
400 of the funds challengers spent on all campaign activities. 5 Thus,
FECA did little more than favor and legitimize a far better organized
corporate form of influence buying, an approach which threatens the
notion that one person's vote equals the next person's vote.
The 1991 campaign reform bills called for voluntary spending
limits, and would have required that no more than one-half of a
candidate's contributions be from outside her state.16 Complying
candidates would have received significant benefits, such as vastly
lower mailing and broadcasting rates, and as much as a million dollars
worth of vouchers for media advertisements. 7 Public financing of
this sort is often suggested as a solution to the problem of undue
influence by special interest groups; but even if there was support
sufficient to pass these bills,"8 there was little reason to believe they
would accomplish any more than their predecessors. The problem is
that in seeking to curtail candidate dependence on PACs, these bills
placed a ceiling on the amount a candidate could accept from all
PACs in an election. 9 This effectively limited the amount a candidate

by a ratio of 2 to 1. House incumbents apparently were able to outspend their
challengers by a ratio of 3 to 1." 139 CONG. REC. S195 (daily ed. Jan. 22, 1993)
(statement by Sen. Boren). See generally DAN CLAWSON ET AL., MONEY TALKS:
CORPORATE PACs AND POLITICAL INFLUENCE (1992) (PACs concentrate donations on
incumbents, overwhelmingly, to obtain access in order to influence matters affecting
company or industry affairs, not ideology, and they achieve undue influence in this
way).
85. See Calamita, supra note 31, at 569. "[D]uring the period from 1985-90,
Senate incumbents received $129.3 million in campaign contributions and $15 million
in free mailing ... [while) their challengers received a total of $38.5 million in

campaign contributions." Id. It should also be noted that the fact these privileges
are paid for with taxpayer money may cause additional legal or political problems.
For example, just as the Court has recognized a constitutional right to participate in
political activities, it has also ensured one's right to remain silent. Wooley v. Maynard,
430 U.S. 705, 713 (1977) (the state cannot require an individual "to participate in

the dissemination of an ideological message..."). See also Kirk J. Nahra, Political
Partiesand the Campaign Finance Laws: Dilemmas, Concerns and Opportunities, 56

L. REV. 53, 108 n.348 (1987) (arguing that a tax check-off for campaign
funding may also be problematic in that the revenues lost must be made up by other
taxpayers).
86. See S.3, 102nd Cong., 2nd Sess. § 502(e)(2) (1991).
87. See 137 CONG. REC. S534 (daily ed. Jan. 15, 1991) (statement by Sen.
Byrd). See also David Broder, Campaign Finance Bills Miss the Point, CHI. TRIB.,
June 2, 1991, § C at 3.
88. In advocating reform in 1990, members of Congress feared that if some
FORDHAM
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could spend, a restriction arguably prohibited in Buckley as violating

freedom of speech. 9° S. 3, introduced in the 103rd Congress, was
finally passed by the Senate on June 17, 1993, adding to the problems
with these bills.9 ' While candidates are free to voluntarily accept
spending limits under the bill, non-participating candidates' contributions are taxed at the top corporate rate with the proceeds ultimately

going to participating candidates, a scheme which is arguably uncon-

stitutional.92
The over-arching problem, of course, is that most campaign
finance legislation focuses on contributions and expenditures; but
because contributions and expenditures support political expression,
such legislation is subject to a high level of First Amendment scrutiny
by the Court. 93 Consequently, many sections of FECA have been
form of campaign finance reform was not forthcoming before the adjournment of
the 101st Congress, the members would suffer defeat in November at the hands of a
"disenchanted electorate." 136 CONG. REC. S17959-60 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990)
(statement by Sen. Durenberger). The Congress still balked at reform. 136 Cong.
Rec. H10993 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1990) (statement by Rep. Thomas). Yet over 90076
of those members were returned to office. Norman Ornstein, Incumbency Theory
Doesn't Explain All, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 7, 1990, § Perspective, at 3.
89. For a criticism of the approach of setting aggregate limits on the total
amount a candidate may accept from PACs, see generally Don M. Millis, The Best
Laid Schemes of Mice and Men: Campaign Finance Reform Gone Awry, 1989 Wis.

L. REV. 1465 (1989) (advocating a repeal of campaign finance restrictions). Millis
argues that contribution limits may also be unconstitutional since they effectively
limit the amount a candidate spends. See id. In addition, a PAC which attempts to
contribute to a campaign which has already accepted the limit is arguably prevented
from exercising its First Amendment rights to contribute to that candidate. Id. at
1488-91.,
90. See Federal Election Comm'm v. Nat'l Conservation Political Action
Comm., 470 U.S. 480 (1985) (holding a statute so over-broad as to violate the PAC's
First Amendment rights); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 39 (1976). See also Nahra,
supra note 85, at 67 n. 101 (restrictions on party spending violate the First Amendment
by limiting political expression and should be abolished or at least reduced). In fact,
the NCPAC Court seems to have concluded that outright corruption may be the only
legitimate reason to limit First Amendment rights in the campaign context. Id. at
500-01. But with "corruption" defined as an explicit quid pro quo arrangement, it
would be difficult to prove except in the most blatant cases of bribery. Nahra, supra
note 85, at 104.
91. S.3, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
92. See 139 CONG. REc. S7572 (daily ed. June 22, 1993) (Sen. McConnell).
"This cute maneuver is doubly unconstitutional - not only does it limit campaign
spending (i.e., political free speech, according to Buckley) through coercion, it actually
taxes that speech - forces candidates who, in effect, speak too much to pay the
government (and ultimately their opponents!) for the privilege." Id.
93. Public discussion and debate over the qualifications of a candidate "are
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invalidated for First Amendment reasons,94 and Congress is now
severely restricted in its ability to address the still significant problem

of rising expenditures by those candidates not accepting public funds.

The Court does not seem to have adequately considered the extent to
which these decisions would hamper the important government objective of diminishing the corrupting influence of money in political
campaigns, 95 nor has the Court fully acknowledged the highly probable
lack of correlation between increased spending and any increased
quantity of speech.

96

Since Buckley, the Court has offered only limited hope that it
might rectify this situation. It did uphold voluntary spending limits
which would reduce the amount of time required for fundraising and
avoid unhealthy quid pro quo obligations between candidates and
contributors. In Republican Nat'l Comm. v. FederalElection Comm., 97
the Republican National Committee was unsuccessful in challenging
the constitutionality of 26 U.S.C. § 9003(b) which imposed spending
limits on presidential candidates seeking to be eligible to receive
payments out of the "Presidential Election Campaign Fund." 98 More
integral to the operation of the system of government established by our Constitution", and finance regulation might intrude on the "area of the most fundamental
First Amendment activities" because it directly bears on the amount of speech in
which a candidate can engage. Buckley, 424 U.S at 14.
94. NCPAC, 470 U.S. at 480. In NCPAC, the Democratic National Committee
sued two conservative PAC's over their intention to spend large sums of money to
re-elect Ronald Reagan. Plaintiffs alleged that Section 9012(0 of the FECA prohibited
the intended large contributions. That section provided that presidential candidates
could take federal funds for their general election campaign, but if they did so, it
became a crime for independent PAC's such as defendants to spend more than
$1,000.00 on that candidate. The Court declared Section 9012(f) an unconstitutional
infringement of First Amendment rights of free speech and association: it was overbroad in its attempt to curb the corruption supposedly caused by large PAC's because
it could be applied to all PAC's, regardless of size. Id. at 490-501.
95. Nahra, supra note 85, at 53 (stating that the Court struggled with a number
of political issues but failed to achieve consistency in campaign finance regulations).
See also NCPAC, 470 U.S. at 480; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 1. The Court has acknowledged that the appearance of undue influence or corruption in an election might
justify regulation. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 790 (1978).
Even though large contributions might amount to unreasonably excessive advocacy,
the Court held that "the fact that advocacy may persuade the electorate is hardly a
reason to suppress it." Id.
96. "The First Amendment protects the right to speak, not the right to spend,
and limitations on the amount of money that can be spent are not the same as
restrictions on speaking." NCPAC, 470 U.S. at 508 (White, J. dissenting).
97. 487 F. Supp. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd mem., 445 U.S. 955 (1980).
98. See 26 U.S.C. § 9003(b) (1980). Conditioning public funding on voluntary
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recently, the Court articulated a new evil that might justify involuntarily curtailing the freedom of speech embodied in political spending.

The Court in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce" upheld a
°°
Michigan statute limiting independent expenditures by corporationsl
even though the statute was found to burden political expression. It
was constitutional because it was "narrowly tailored to further a

compelling state interest." 01 The state sought to control the "corrosive
and distorting effects" of wealth accumulated through the unique
advantages of the corporate form and spent to advance political ideas

even though such wealth has "little or no correlation to the public's
' 0 The statute still
support for the corporation's political ideas."'
permitted corporate political spending in Michigan, but only if made

0
from separate funds, not from the corporation's general treasury, °4

a principle that seems consistent with Buckley and the FECA itself.'

spending limits is not a substantial and direct restriction on the ability to engage in
political expression. Republican Nat'l Comm. v. Federal Election Comm., 487 F.
Supp. 280, 284-5 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd mem., 445 U.S. 955 (1980). Although the
plaintiffs contended that the provisions violated the constitutional rights of a majorparty presidential candidate and his supporters, the court stated that even if the there
were some burden on the First Amendment rights of a candidate, or his supporters,
"the conditions placed on the expenditure of public funds are necessary to the
effectiveness of a program which furthers significant state interests." Id. at 285-86.
Buckley stated that restrictions on the amount a person can spend reduces the
quantity of expression. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19. However, that Court also stated
that conditioning public funding on spending limits is permissible. Id. at 57 n.65.
99. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
100. Michigan Campaign Finance Act, 1976; Mich. Pub. Acts 388 (codified at
MICH. CoMP. LAWS §§ 169.201-.282 (1990). The statute bars direct expenditures of
general treasury funds, but allows a corporation to establish a segregated fund to be
used for political purposes. The rationale is that those who disagree with the corporate
view, but who have an interest in the corporation, should not have to support those
views.
101. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
102. Id.
103. Id. (reasoning that contributions from segregated funds would be permissible because contributors would realize-that their money would be used for political
activities and so "the speech generated accurately reflects contributors' support for
the corporation's political views"). The Buckley Court had specifically rejected
attempts to limit independent expenditures, stating that such limits would have far
less impact on corruption than controlling contributions, and that the weight of that
government interest was insufficient to justify reducing the quantity of speech.
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44-45. Justice Scalia, in dissent in Austin, accused the majority
of finding evil in too much speech and of embracing the previously rejected notion
that expenditures should "reflect actual public. support for the political ideas espoused." Austin, 494 U.S. at 687.

104. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 28-29 n.31 (stating that donations to particular
candidates are to be made up by voluntary contributions to political committees).
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This new "corruption test," which has at least upheld a government interest in avoiding the corrosive and distorting effects of
accumulated corporate wealth, may pave the way for further regulation.105 Concrete economic and thus political equality between candidates, however, is still beyond reach. The language in Austin is broad
but the holding still narrowly applies to only general corporate funds.
Even spending ceilings or limits on all sources and all candidates
would not radically improve the electoral system, since challengers
would continue to be significantly disadvantaged. 106 Spending limitations in current public financing proposals continue to fail to address
the inherent unfairness of spending limits placed on challengers and
the political parties that would support them. 0 7 Challengers can only
overcome the name recognition and other perquisites of office enjoyed
by incumbents through their own spending. 0 Thus, spending limits

105. See Samuel M. Taylor, Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce: Ad-

dressing a "New Corruption" in Campaign Financing, 69 N.C.L. REV. 1060, 1078
(1991) (arguing that Austin could lead to the regulation of media corporations). See
also David Cole, First Amendment Antitrust: The End of Laissez-Faire in Campaign
Finance, 9 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 236 (1991) (concluding that the strict scrutiny test
in Austin, which .recognized the compelling interest in counteracting the distortion of
wealth on the political process, was needed to protect individual constitutional rights).
106. "[A]n incumbent usually begins the race with significant advantages. In
addition to the factors of voter recognition and status accruing to holding federal
office, the incumbent has access to substantial resources provided by the Government.
These include . . .offices, staff support, and the franking privilege." Buckley, 424
U.S. at 31 n.33.
107. See id. at 3 (a ceiling on the use of personal funds is a "direct restriction
on the ability of candidates to engage in protected political expression"). Further,
voluntary limits are not really voluntary because of the heavy penalty exacted from
those who opt to forego subsidies. See 137 CONG.REC. S6477, S6479 (daily ed. May
23, 1991) (statement of Sen. Nickles).
108. As a result of FECA restrictions and Buckley, political parties have become
significant sources of substantial funds because they now raise small amounts of
money from greater numbers of people. Nahra, supra note 85, at 91. Consequently,
it has also been suggested that permitting political parties to contribute to campaigns
without limit might help to equalize spending and reduce the impact of PACs. Id. at
102 (arguing that restricting political parties may be unconstitutional in that they are
more like individuals than PACs and one cannot be limited in spending on one's
own behalf). Nevertheless, 1991 Senate campaign finance reform bills included
significant restrictions on state parties, limiting the amount they could accept for
coordinated registration and voting drives. See Broder, supra note 87, at 3. Broder
views these party activities as being "at the heart of electoral democracy, but Congress
is threatening to clamp down on them" even though the bill the Senate passed and
the one the House attempted to pass are based on public perceptions the members
of Congress know to be false. By abolishing PACs and capping campaign spending
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those already found in FECA-actually harm challengers

and further entrench incumbents. 10 9 So then, if not campaign finance
regulation, what else could promote fair elections by restraining the
advantages of incumbency?

IV.

THE ROOTS OF TERM LIMITATION

Place before the eyes of ... men a post of honor, that shall
be at the same time a place of profit, and they will move
heaven and earth to obtain it.

Benjamin Franklin" 0

History offers support for the notion that legislative term limitation is consistent with the American tradition."' The delegates to
(which probably is unconstitutional) "the bills taking shape deal unsatisfactorily with
the crucialproblem . . .[which] is the financial starvation of challengers .

. . ."

Id.

Instead, it is suggested that Congress "do the one thing that might really help
challengers - ease the restrictions on fundraising and spending by the political
parties, the only institutions in America that have an intrinsic interest in electing nonincumbents to office." Id. See also S. 3, 103rd Cong. 1st Sess. § 313 (1993) (amending
FECA by adding § 324 subjecting contributions from political parties to the limitations
set forth in the bill). After all, even assuming Congress could solve the intractable
problem of calculating appropriate handicaps to counter the advantages that political
inertia give to incumbents, "Congress' self-interest would make it hesitant to approve
of active anti-advantage legislation for the same reasons that legislators are unlikely
to limit their own terms." Jonathan Mansfield, Note, A Choice Approach to the
Constitutionality of Term Limitation Laws, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 966, 997 (1993).
"[It] appears unlikely that a measure that gives extra campaign money to congres-

sional challengers would gain much support from incumbents." Id.
109. Since contributions from "ordinary" people tend to be too small to fund
a campaign, candidates with large working class constituencies must depend on a
smaller number of wealthy benefactors. Therefore, if the laws prohibit large "individual" contributions, the voice of the "working class" is suppressed, while candidates with many wealthier supporters who can afford the legal individual limits may
be untouched by reform legislation. Stephen E. Gottlieb, The Dilemma of Election
Campaign Finance Reform, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 213 (1989). See also Gross, supra
note 76, at 286:
[T]he FECA as currently written does not adequately deter violations of the
statute. [Continuing] violations may give the [incumbent] an unfair advantage in the election. [Further,] many view a civil penalty imposed after a
successful campaign as a small price to pay for winning the election.
110. JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

52 (1966) (quoting Benjamin Franklin speaking against an excessive salary for the
chief executive).
111. See generally WILL, supra note 22. But see Wills, supra note 22; THE
FEDERALIST PAPERS 326 (1961) (Madison):
[t]he qualifications of the elected . . . have been very properly considered
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our national Constitutional Convention of 1787 never completely
resolved the issue of the appropriate tenure for public officials.
Nevertheless, the lack of any explicit effort during the Convention to
limit the number of legislative terms is curious, given both the rhetoric
related to this subject found in the debates' 1 2 and the existing precedent
at the time of the adoption of the Constitution. For example, the
Virginia Bill of Rights of 1776, influential in the drafting of the
United States Constitution, had recognized the importance of frequent
rotation in public offices. It provided that in order to protect the
people from oppression, the members of the legislature and the
executive:
should, at fixed periods, be reduced to a private station, return
into that body from which they were originally taken, and the
vacancies be supplied by frequent, certain, and regular election, in which all, or any part of the former members, to be
again eligible, or ineligible, as the laws shall direct." 3
The 1781 Articles of Confederation had provided for a unicameral
federal legislature with delegates appointed annually bi the state
legislatures. The states retained the right to recall and replace delegates
at any time. In addition, delegates could not serve more than three
out of every six years. 1 4 In fact, a bitter dispute in the Continental
Congress developed over violations of this later provision."' 5 As a
result, the question was fresh in the minds of those who ultimately
became delegates to the 1787 Constitutional Convention, the vast
majority of whom had been members of the Continental Congress." 6
The Constitutional Convention established a unique government
that would derive its powers from the consent of the governed." 7 The
and regulated by the [constitutional] convention.
OF CONGRESS 871 (1807):
the committee proceeded to examine the Constitution, with relation to the
case submitted to them, and find that qualifications of members are therein
determined without reserving any authority to the State Legislatures to
change, add to or diminish those qualifications ....

See also 17 ANNALS

112. See WILL, supra note 22, at 192-98 (stating the delegates concerns about
long terms in office while they debated the appropriate length for Senate terms).
113. VA. CONST. art. 1, §5.
114. See generally MADISON, supra note 110; see also Will, supra note 22.
115. In 1784, an altercation ensued when the Congress attempted to purge
violating delegates. It was discovered that Samuel Osgood of Massachusetts had
exceeded his three years, and that two Delaware and two Rhode Island delegates
would soon be ineligible. Osgood offered to withdraw, but when the Rhode Island
delegates objected, the Congress apparently chose to drop the matter in order to
proceed with other business. See WILL, supra note 22, at 103.
116. See, e.g.,

EDWARD C. SMITH, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

8
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delegates sought to promote this principle by requiring frequent
elections for legislators, making them easily replaceable by and thus
directly accountable to the voters. The Convention had a difficult
time achieving a compromise among competing proposals for the
length of a single legislative term."' The delegates ultimately set twoyear terms for the House of Representatives. More importantly, the
debates on this issue suggest an implicit assumption on their part that
frequent elections would produce a relatively high turnover;" 9 hence,
with this expectation of frequent rotation through elections, the
delegates apparently did not need to confront the question of a proper
limit on successive terms.
For example, Roger Sherman of Connecticut, speaking for the
short two-year proposal, expressed the spirit behind that choice - 20
that representatives ought to return home to mix with the people,'
or, by permanently "remaining at the seat of government, they would
acquire the habits of the place, which might differ from those of their
constituents."' 2' The only limitation on one's ability to run for office
actually suggested was that members of the House be ineligible for
any other office during their terms and for one year after. This
proposal was ultimately rejected as it would "discourage merit" and
(1979) (of the fifty-five delegates who attended the convention, thirty-nine had served
in the Continental Congress).
117. The people, being sovereign, have the power to alter or abolish that
government when abuse and usurpation become intolerable and tyrannical. THE
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). On the development of the
notion of popular sovereignty, see generally, W. P. ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONS: REPUBLICAN IDEOLOGY AND THE MAKING OF THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS

ERA (1980); MICHAEL G. KAMMEN, THE ORIGINS OF THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (1986); GORDON S. WOOD, THE
CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1783 (1969). See also EDMOND S. MORIN THE REVOLUTIONARY

GAN,

INVENTING THE PEOPLE: THE RISE OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN ENGLAND AND

AMERICA (1988) (noting that it is this "fiction" which allows for the maintenance of
social stability in America).
118. Delegates proposed various resolutions calling for one, two, or three-year
terms for Congressmen. MADISON, supra note 110, at 168-70 (concluding that annual
and biannual elections would be inconvenient for the representatives). Resolutions
were debated, proposing terms for anywhere from four years to "during good
behavior" for Senators. Id. at 191-98.
119. See generally MADISON, supra note 110, at 191-98. The delegates discussed

the replacement in membership which would occur through frequent elections along
with a "rotation system" (electing only a portion of the representatives at a time), a
scheme that would provide stability while allowing for "new views and impulses."
Id.
120. Id. at 170.
121. Id.
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render the best members ineligible for subsequent official positions.122
The debate surrounding term length for Senators focused on the
conflict between the need for stability and accumulated wisdom, and
the need to allow for new impulses through rotation. While some23
urged that Senators ought to hold office during good behavior,
many agreed with delegate Charles Pinkney, who suggested that a
term of office greater than four years "would fix them at the seat of
Government and they would acquire an interest there and transfer
their property and lose sight of the states they represent." 24 Delegate
James Wilson, who objected to long terms, feared that the Senate
might "by gradual encroachments prolong itself first into a body for
life, and finally become a hereditary one. ' 1 2s The final compromise,
which included a six-year term, appeased those anxious to ensure
political accountability by providing that one-third of the Senate
would face reelection every second year.
Most proposals to limit the number of successive legislative terms
are rather recent; but several hundred proposals have been introduced
throughout history to alter the President's term. This was no doubt
due to the naturally greater fear of tyranny from the executive given
the greater concentration of power in the hands of the President as
compared to any particular legislator.1 26 For many years presidential
term limitation was unnecessary; George Washington's refusal to seek
a third term seemed to have established firm precedent. When President Grant expressed an interest in a third term, the House passed a
bipartisan resolution that Washington's self-restraint had become "a
part of our republican system of government, and that any departure
from this time-honored custom would be unwise, unpatriotic, and
fraught with peril to our free institutions."'' 27 Not until after President
Franklin D. Roosevelt broke with tradition did the presidential twoterm limitation become explicit. The Twenty-Second Amendment,
122. Nevertheless, delegate Butler countered that "characters fit for office would
never be unknown." Id. at 179.
123. Id. at 195-98. Delegate Roger Sherman agreed that stability and wisdom
were important, but even he thought that four to six years of service was sufficient
to provide these virtues because, he argued, "Government is for those who live under
it. It ought therefore to be so construed as riot to be dangerous to their liberties. The
more permanency it has the worse if it be a bad government. Thus, frequent elections
are necessary to preserve good behavior." Id. at 195.
124. MADISON, supra note 110, at 192.
125. Id. at 198.
126. See, e.g., Wills, supra note 22, at 31.

127. Stephen W. Stathis, The Twenty-Second Amendment: A PracticalRemedy
or Partisan Maneuver?, 7 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY 61, 64 (1990).
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introduced in and approved by Congress soon after Roosevelt's death
in 1946, was ratified in the state legislatures by 1951. Republicans,
alarmed by the rapid centralization of governmental functions under
Roosevelt and his expansion of and control over huge bureaucracies,
were the primary advocates of the Amendment. They thought the
great expansion of national regulatory power in the 1930s and 1940s
was "all due to the built-up, accumulated potency and power of one
man remaining too long in public office."'' 2 A two-term limitation,
they believed, would safeguard democracy from "the aggrandizement,
consolidation, and even usurpation of political power." 29 Conversely,
Democrats were generally against the amendment, considering it antiRoosevelt. They argued that such a limitation would be an undemocratic restraint on the will of the people, an argument similar to those
often advanced today in opposition to Congressional term limitations. 130
V.

CONGRESSIONAL TERM LIMITATION BY CONSTITUTIONAL

AMENDMENT?

It is essential to such a government that [legislators] be derived
from the great body of the society, not from an inconsiderable
proportion or a favored class of it; otherwise, a handful of

tyrannical nobles, exercising their oppression by a delegation
of their powers, might aspire to the rank of republicans and
claim for their government the honorable title of republic.
James Madison 3 '
In a democracy, it is difficult to long maintain the position that
any individual legislator is indispensable or irreplaceable, especially
when numerous available and qualified challengers are consistently
locked out of the political arena by the structure and operation of
the political system. Term limitations, of course, might frustrate some
128.

ALAN

P.

GRIMES, DEMOCRACY AND THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION

117 (1978) (quoting Sen. Graham (R-PA)). Proponents believed that Roosevelt's
reelection was directly related to his spending powers and powers of patronage.
129. Stathis, supra note 127, at 69. Senator Wiley (R-Wis) argued that "continuance of power in the hands of an individual or a party over a considerable period
of time made possible a Hitler, a Mussolini, and all the little Fascists." Id.
130. During the debates over the 22nd Amendment, Senator O'Daniel (D-Tex)
offered an amendment to limit the tenure of members of Congress as well as
presidents; not surprisingly, it was rejected 82-1. Grimes, supra note 128, at 120.
131. THE FEDERALIST No. 39, 241 (James Madison) (1961).
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voters who, if given the opportunity, would prefer to continue to
reelect a lawmaker; but the state may have countervailing interests
sufficiently compelling to limit their right -to do so. In fact, most
voters have indicated that they believe the constraints of term limits
are preferable to the dangers of prolonged power.' Incumbents who
wish to serve the public can simply continue to do so in another
capacity; the challenges of the new position or form of service would
energize and stimulate talented officials.
Even if present Congressional term limitation proposals, which
mostly create a subsequent life-time ineligibility, are held unconstitutional, term limit supporters are beginning to consider proposals more
like those in the Articles of Confederation, provisions requiring a
periodic but not permanent ineligibility. These "modified" term
limitations are likely to substantially accomplish the same goals as the
"life-time ban" provisions, yet they are less restrictive of the voting
rights of incumbent legislators and their supporters, characteristics
that may ultimately tip the scales toward constitutionality. A representative would be eligible for three terms in every eight years and
would again be eligible after sitting out every fourth term; Senators
would be eligible for two terms every eighteen years, thus becoming
eligible again after stepping aside every third term. These periodic
limitations would reward valuable public servants for superior performance by allowing for the ultimate return to office of those persons
most effective in that office.'
Of course, the important question is whether Congressional term
limitation can be achieved, regardless of the significant merit to such
proposals. The most direct approach would be to enact an amendment
to the United States Constitution. The United States Constitution
provides for two methods of proposing an amendment: by a vote of
a two-thirds majority of both Houses of Congress, or by application
to Congress from two-thirds of the state legislatures calling for a
constitutional convention. 34 To date, Congress has proposed all
132. In 1986, a Newsweek poll showed President Reagan to be "immensely
popular," yet 62% of those interviewed were opposed to giving him a third term,
and 60% opposed repeal of the Twenty-Second Amendment. Stathis, supra note 127,
at 81. Clearly, voters do not appear to believe that their inability to reelect President
Reagan deprived them of an indispensable leader or unacceptably limited their
freedom to choose a president. Currently, 70% of Americans favor term limitations
for Congressman. See 136 CONG. REC. S5030 (daily ed. Apr. 20, 1990) (Sen.
Humphrey citing a Gallup Poll conducted Jan. 1990).
133. Many state governors are subject to such laws. See 136 CONG. REC. S5678
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amendments.' 35 With the exception of the Twenty-First Amendment, 31 6
(daily ed. May 3, 1990) (statement by Sen. Humphrey). 29 states limit terms of
governors and other top office holders. Virginia and Kentucky allow only one term
for statewide elected office. States are not barred by the United States Constitution
from limiting the terms of their state and local elected officials. See, e.g., Maloney
v. McCartney, 223 S.E.2d 607 (W.Va. 1976) (state constitutional amendment limiting
governor to two terms is constitutional). These statewide elected officials often benefit
the State by moving on to serve in a different capacity once completing their terms.
For example, Chuck Robb (D-VA), former governor, served his limit, and then
became a Senator from Virginia. Many states accomplish this in practice even though
it is not constitutionally required.
134. Throughout history, a few scholars have suggested that Article V (the
federal amending clause) may not be exclusive and that the people might also have a
third alternative, an "inalienable right to alter or abolish government" proclaimed
in the Declaration of Independence. See e.g., Amar, infra note 170 (arguing for an
unenumerated right in a majority of the people to ratify an amendment); WILLIAM
MACDONALD,

A

NEW CONSTITUTION FOR A NEW AMERICA

(1921) (arguing that this

right is not hortatory, that Article V is not exclusive, and that the right might support
a constitutional convention call). The problem is that language to this effect is not
found in the Constitution even though Madison urged inclusion of language stating
that:
the people have an indubitable, inalienable, and indefeasible right to reform
or change their Government, whenever it may be found adverse or inadequate to the purposes of its institution.

PETER SUBER, THE PARADOX OF SELF-AMENDMENT: A STUDY OF LOGIC, LAW, OMNIPOTENCE, AND CHANGE 225 (1990) (citing HERBERT VANDENBERG AMES, THE PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS

TO

THE CONSTITUTION

OF THE UNITED

STATES

DURING

THE FIRST

185 (1897)). Division of opinion on this subject existed
during the Revolutionary Era. Compare THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (James Madison)
(this is a real power) with THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (such
language is hortatory). Suber, supra, at 226. Additional support for the unenumerated
right lies in the fact that the Virginia "peace convention," after the civil war,
proposed amendments that, inter alia, would have recognized the "reserved power
of the people in three fourths of the states to call a national convention to alter,
amend, or abolish the constitution . . . " a power that would "never be questioned."
Suber, supra, at 225 (citing AMES, supra). The clearly prevailing view, however, is
that Article V is exclusive. See, e.g., Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956),
rehearing denied, 351 U.S. 928 (1956): "Nothing new can be put into the constitution
except through the amending power. Nothing can be taken out without the same
process." Id. at 450. Direct popular amendment would be tantamount to revolution.
JOHN ALEXANDER JAMESON, A TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS: THEIR
HISTORY, POWERS, AND MODES OF PROCEEDING 559 (1887). See also HENRY ROTTSCHAEFER, HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTION LAW (1939) (cited in Suber, supra,
at 164):
The legal assumption that sovereignty is ultimately vested in the people
affords no legal basis for the direct exercise by them of any sovereign power
whose direct exercise has not been expressly or impliedly reserved.
135. Prior to 1992, six of the proposed amendments passed by Congress were
defeated by the states: 1) a scheme to apportion the House of0 Representatives (1789);
CENTURY OF ITS HISTORY

1993:11

LEGISLA TIVE TERM LIMITA TION

ratification of these amendments has been by state legislatures, rather
than by state conventions. Congress is yet to call a convention when
requested by two-thirds of the states. Indeed, it might never call a
convention. "I7

At least twelve term limitation amendment proposals from the
House and two from the Senate emerged in the 102nd Congress.' 31 In
the 103rd Congress, sixteen term limitation amendment proposals
emerged from the House, and four from the Senate.

39

All but six

2) a rule barring Congressional salary increases from taking effect until after the next
election of representatives (submitted with the Bill of Rights in 1789, but certified by
the Archivist of the United States as the Twenty-Seventh Amendment in 1992); 3) a
rule to strip U.S. citizenship from any citizen accepting a title, present or office from
a foreign power without the consent of Congress (1810); 4) the Corwin Amendment,
an attempt to forestall the abolition of slavery, and thus the Civil War (1861); 5) the
Child Labor Amendment (1924); and 6) the Equal Rights Amendment (1972).
136. The Twenty-first Amendment was referred to state conventions in order to
obtain the opinion of delegates chosen specifically to determine the future of
prohibition. See GRIMES, supra note 128, at 121.
137. Even though the federal amending clause may "require" Congress to call
a constitutional convention when a "petition of a certain type is received, [despite]
the mandatory language it has an operational discretion to refuse, knowing that the
courts will not order them to take action." SUBER, supra note 134, at 178. This may
have happened in 1929. Id. The federal amending clause:
is silent on such questions as whether the application must call for a
particular amendment . . ., whether it must be the same type of amendment
in each application and whether the applications must occur within a certain
span of time. Nor has Congress yet answered these questions with supplementary legislation. Two thirds of the state legislatures had applied to
Congress by 1929, requesting a convention, although not all requested the
same type of amendment and three of the applications dated back to 1788
(Virginia), 1789 (New York) and 1833 (Alabama). [citations omitted]. Congress did nothing, even after Wisconsin, the last state needed for the two
thirds majority, summarized the history of applications and reminded Congress of its duty under Article V. (citations omitted).
Id.
138. H.R.J. Res. 21, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); H.R.J. Res. 22, 102nd
Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); H.R.J. Res. 28, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); H.R.J. Res.
42, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); H.R.J. Res. 54, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991);
H.R.J. Res. 93, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); H.R.J. Res. 99, 102nd Cong., 1st
Sess. (1991); H.R.J. Res. 112, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); H.R.J. Res. 335, 102nd
Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); H.R.J. Res. 363, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); H.R.J. Res.
382, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); H.R.J. Res. 418, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991);
H.R.J. Res. 462, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); H.R.J. Res. 554, 102nd Cong., 1st
Sess. (1991); S.J. Res. 12, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); S.J. Res. 227, 102nd Cong.,
1st Sess. (1991).
139. H.R.J. Res. 21, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); H.R.J. Res. 31, 103rd
Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); H.R.J. Res. 36, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); H.R.J. Res.
37, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); H.R.J. Res. 45, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993);
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proposals in the 102nd and 103rd Congresses provided for twelve year
term limits,"40 some provided for four-year terms for members of the
House of Representatives, 4' and two stipulated a maximum of two
six-year terms for the president. 142 These proposals have been submitted for the record and sent to committees for study and review.
Perhaps the most reasonable of these measures allow for a limited
number of consecutive years in office but would allow a member to
run again after sitting out for one term.143 Forcing a member to return
home from the legislature periodically would allow the voters to retain
the services of their best representatives, while requiring them to run
against incumbents at least occasionally. This guarantees a periodic
return to fair and energetic debate on questions of importance, and
encourages new ideas; political and social innovations stand a better
chance of surfacing during elections with no incumbents. However,
term limitation is-not to be expected from members of Congress who
H.R.J. Res. 47, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); H.R.J. Res. 51, 103rd Cong., 1st
Sess. (1993); H.R.J. Res. 70, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); H.R.J. Res. 71, 103rd
Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); H.R.J. Res. 77, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); H.R.J. Res.
99, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); H.R.J. Res. 164, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993);
H.R.J. Res. 170, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); H.R.J. Res. 200, 103rd Cong., 1st
Sess. (1993); H.R.J. Res. 203, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); H.R.J. Res. 221, 103rd
Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); S.J. Res. 12, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); S.J. Res. 18,
103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); S.J. Res. 33, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); S.J. Res.
34, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
140. H.R.J. Res. 28, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (eighteen years for Senate);
H.R.J. Res. 42, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (six years); H.R.J. Res. 31, 103rd
Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (eight years for House); H.R.J. Res. 77, 103rd Cong., 1st
Sess. (1993) (eight years for House); H.R.J. Res. 200, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993)
(ten years for House); S.J. Res. 33, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (eight years for
House).
141. H.R.J. Res. 21, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); H.R.J. Res. 54, 102nd
Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); H.R.J. Res. 112, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); H.R.J. Res.
363, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); H.R.J. Res. 554, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991);
H.R.J. Res. 36, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); H.R.J. Res. 37, 103rd Cong., 1st
Sess. (1993); H.R.J. Res. 51, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); H.R.J. Res. 70, 103rd
Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); H.R.J. Res. 71, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); H.R.J. Res.
203, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
142. H.R.J. Res. 28, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); H.R.J. Res. 554, 102nd
Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
143. H.R.J. Res. 28, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); H.R.J. Res. 93, 102nd
Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); H.R.J. Res. 335, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); H.R.J. Res.
363, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); H.R.J. Res. 418, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991);
H.R.J. Res. 462, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); H.R.J. Res. 21, 103rd Cong., 1st
Sess. (1993); H.R.J. Res. 36, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); H.R.J. Res. 45, 103rd
Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); H.R.J. Res. 47, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); H.R.J. Res.
170, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); S.J. Res. 33, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); S.J.
Res. 34, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
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benefit from the present system in which continued incumbency leads

to seniority and economic and political power.

The second method of amending the Constitution is by application to Congress from two-thirds of the state legislatures calling for
a constitutional convention. The constitutional convention came into
1
being for the occasions when the people, as the ultimate sovereign, 4
desire changes in the nature, principles, or mode of operation of their
government. The legislative history of Article V, and certainly the
history of the use of state constitutional conventions, 45 suggest that

the constitutional convention may be used not only to reassess the
entire constitution, but for specific changes thought necessary but
unlikely to be initiated by Congress, 146 e.g., a term limitation amend-

ment. A movement is presently underway in a number of states to

petition Congress for a constitutional convention; several national
term limitation amendment groups have formed to help coordinate

petition drives in the states. 147 There is, however, a somewhat legitimate fear among constitutional scholars that any constitutional con-

vention would do more harm than good to the document that has
served us fairly well for 200 years. 14 Their concern is the possibility
144. The notion of representative democracy assumes that the power of government is vested ultimately in the people. The common theme throughout the debates
in the Constitutional Convention of 1787 was that no institution of government
'should be above or beyond the reach of those from whom it derived its power. It is
for this reason that the framers provided 'for state conventions as an alternative to
Congress for proposing amendments. E. Donald Elliott, Constitutional Conventions
and the Deficit, 1985 DUKE L.J. 1077, 1084-85 (1985). George Mason of Virginia,
who had drafted the Virginia Bill of Rights, felt strongly about the danger of leaving
Congress with absolute power over the amendment process. Id. at 1082-83. Such
power would be inimical to representative government because the people would be
rendered helpless to check an insolent, oppressive Congress. Mason urged that in
such cases "[i]t would be improper to require the consent of the National Legislature,
because they may abuse their power, and refuse their consent on that very account."
Id. at 1083. Thus, it seems clear that an important role of the constitutional
convention is to ensure that the people have power to propose changes in political
institutions which those institutions are not apt to initiate themselves; that is, the
convention is a "domestication of the right to revolution." Id. at 1079.
145. Anita Bernstein, Book Review, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 802, 810-12 (1990)
(reviewing RUSSELL CAPLAN, CONSTITUTIONAL BRINKMANSHIP (1988)). See generally
Francis H. Heller, Limiting a Constitutional Convention: The State Precedents, 3
CARDOZO L. REV. 563 (1982); Henry D. Levine, Note, Limited Federal Constitutional
Conventions: Implications of the State Experiences, I I HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 127

(1973).
146. See also infra notes 233-34 and accompanying text (this was the justification
for the popular initiative in the states as well).
147. Examples of these groups are Americans To Limit Congressional Terms,
based in Wash. D.C., and T.H.R.O. (Throw the Rascals Out) based in Florida.

148. Laurence Tribe, Issues Raised by Requesting Congress to Call a Constitu-
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of a "runaway" convention, one with an unlimited agenda; there
49
might be no way to limit a convention to a single issue or proposal.

The language of Article V declares that Congress, on application by
two-thirds of the states, "shall call a convention for proposing
amendments."' 50 The early language of that passage, however, had

been "shall propose amendments to this Constitution."'' This might
indicate that specific amendments are to be proposed by the national

convention rather than by the states,' hence the fear that delegates
to that convention might feel free to change the Constitution at will.' 53
The contrary view is that delegates to any national convention
would still be elected or appointed in the states, impliedly conferring
upon the states the power to select only those candidates committed
to the local position on the issue. While a delegate could subsequently
betray the trust of those who elected her based on her early public
position, it is unlikely that a stray delegate could muster enough
support among other delegates to inflict any material disappointment
of local expectations. Further, delegates do not have the power to

rewrite the Constitution or enact amendments themselves; threefourths of the states must still ratify any proposed changes, either

through state conventions or legislatures. Finally, in addition to the
inherent protection provided through state participation in the process,

tional Convention to Propose a Balanced Budget Amendment, 10 PAC. L.J. 627, 628
(1979) (calling a convention for proposing a Balanced Budget Amendment is "a
needless undertaking . . .likely to invite division and confrontation where unity and
cooperation are critical, one likely to thwart rather than vindicate the will of the
American people and damage rather than mend the Constitution"). See also Elliott,
supra note 144, at 1078, n.50.
149. See, e.g., Walter E. Dellinger, The Recurring Question of the "Limited"
Constitutional Convention, 88 YALE L.J. 1623 (1979) (claiming that Congress cannot
limit the convention). Compare Grover Rees 111, Constitutional Conventions and
Constitutional Arguments: Some Thoughts About Limits, 6 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 79 (1982) (claiming that states can limit a convention) with Heller, supra note
145, at 563 (arguing that states may not limit a national convention).
150. U.S. CONST. art. V.
151. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 555 (1937).
152. See Dellinger, supra note 149, at 1636 ("[W]hile a convention should be
influenced in its choice of agenda by the grievances that led the states to apply for
its convocation, the authority to determine the agenda and draft the amendments to
be proposed should rest with the convention rather than with Congress or the state
legislature."). For another opinion-that a convention could not be limited, see Charles
L. Black Jr., Amending the Constitution: A Letter to a Congressman, 82 YALE L.J.
189 (1972).
153. "[Djelegates might propose and approve amendments on subjects other
than those for which Congress ... had called the convention .... " Bernstein, supra
note 145, at 804 (citing CAPLAN, supra note 145, at 138).
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Congress itself could "limit" any convention by refusing to submit
ultra vires or undesirable amendments to the states.' 54

Even though a constitutional convention has never been called,
the threat of a convention can have the same practical effect as a
convention.' Previous movements in the states to invoke the Convention Clause have impacted national political thinking, 5 6 and have
occasionally served to spur Congress to action. The Seventeenth
Amendment, for example, which directly affected Congress by providing for direct election of Senators,' 57 was proposed and approved

154. Id. at 810.
155. The most current petition drives have been for the Equal Rights Amendment
and for a Balanced Budget Amendment. Id. at 812. The latter is still alive and is
lacking the approval of only two states before Congress would be "required" to call
a convention. In an effort to diffuse the issue, Congress passed the "GrammRudman" Act (The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act, Pub. L.
No. 99-177, 99 Stat. f037 (1985)). Unfortunately, like proposals for campaign finance
reform, Gramm-Rudman was reduced significantly in its effect when the Supreme
Court limited its scope and Congress began ignoring its deadlines. See generally Gary
A. Loxley & Thomas F. Mitola, The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control
Act of 1974: Gramm-Rudman and Beyond, 14 OHIo N.U.L. REV. 329 (1987). See
also Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (requirement that
the president issue sequestration orders implementing budget reductions in the Comptroller-General's report unconstitutionally vests executive power in an officer removable by Congress, in violation of separation of powers). In addition, Congress has
failed to meet the April 15 budget deadline at least twice. In 1987, Congress waived
the deadline in order to recess for July 4, finally producing a budget on October 30.
Like an amendment that would limit terms of members of Congress, the Balanced
Budget Amendment seeks to somehow control a Congress perceived as being unable
to limit expenditures, and a constitutional convention is thought to be necessary to
achieve fiscal responsibility on the part of Congress. Bernstein, supra note 145, at
812-13. Many view the deficit problem and Congressional inaction as so serious that
a convention might be the only solution. Elliott, supra note 144, at 1086-87. For
example, Pete Domenici, chair of the Senate Budget Committee, and James Jones,
chair of the House Budget Committee, both agree that the deficit is out of control
and that Congress is incapable of acting due to the "onslaught of hundreds of big,
powerful special-interest groups." Id. at 1088 (quoting Richard Snelling, The Deficit's
Clear & Present Danger, N.Y. TiMEs, Mar. 3 1985 (magazine) at 48, 70). Therefore,
it is not unreasonable to argue that by eliminating the perpetual legislative focus on
reelection, the influence of monied interest groups diminishes, and the incentive (as
well as ability) to deal with the deficit and other serious problems increases. If a
petition drive for term limitations can assist in accomplishing these goals, so much
the better.
156. Elliott, supra note 144, at 813 n.84 ("[Sitate legislatures played a role by
mounting pressure for a convention" to amend the Constitution to require direct
election of Senators).
157. Id.
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by Congress, but only after 31 states had petitioned to call a convention for such an amendment. The proposal had previously been
rejected by the Senate.
VI.

TERM LIMITATION BY POPULAR INITIATIVE

The movement toward direct democracy"' s began in the early

decades of this century. 5 9 The Progressives, who were instrumental

158. Those who advocate direct democracy support "[g]ranting voters the option
to propose legislation and decide issues themselves through either the initiative or the
popular referendum . . . ." DAVID B. MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION 2 (1984). Direct
primary elections to nominate candidates for public office, direct elections of U.S.
senators, and direct election of the President in place of the electoral college system
have also been part of the program of direct democracy. Id.
159. See MAGLEBY, supra note 158. Initiative and referendum resolutions were
in the platforms of the Socialist Labor Party and the Populist Party as early as 1892,
and were supported and later heavily promoted by the AFL. DAVID D. SCHMIDT,
CITIZEN LAWMAKERS 5-9 (1989). As the movement for initiative swept throughout the
United States, the Progressives adopted the Populist platform, won elections, and
then pushed for passage of initiative and referendum provisions in legislatures and
conventions in 18 states between 1910 and 1914. Id. Another related outgrowth of
the populist reform movement was the idea that citizens should possess the right to
recall public officials before their terms expired. See JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY

38, 105-06 (1986). This distrust of government was rooted in

Jacksonian democracy, which attempted to maintain continuous accountability by
providing terms of only 6 months to 1 year for public officials. Id. Jeffersonians, of
course, had also thought the people were the proper repositories of government. Id.
Fourteen states allow the removal of state officials, Id. at 106 n.9, and seventeen
states allow recall of local officials by general law, special law, or local charter. Id.
at 107 n.12.
Three states also attempt to provide for recall of members of Congress. Id. at
107-08. Wisconsin authorizes voters to petition to recall any elected official (Wis.
CONST. art. XIII, § 12), and Michigan specifically includes members of the House
and Senate in its recall provision (1954 Mich. Pub. Acts 116 and MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. §§ 168.121, 168.149 (West 1967)). ZIMMERMAN, supra, at 108 n.20. Arizona
stipulates that Congressional candidates may file a pledge to resign should they lose

a recall election. 1973 Ariz. Sess. Laws 159;

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.

§ 19-221 (1984).

supra, at 108 n.22. Except in Arizona, where a recall imposes only a
"moral obligation" to resign should a member lose a recall election, these provisions
may violate the United States Constitution. Id. at 108 n.21. State recall of national
legislators may be pre-empted by the Congressional power to discipline or expel its
members.
Those states with recall have not experienced weakened government or abuse by
political or ideological groups; but neither have they experienced a much greater level
of official responsibility. Id. at 127. Recall has been used most effectively at the level
of local government. It has only once unseated a governor (Gov. Lynn Frazier of
North Dakota was removed by a recall election in 1921). Id."
ZIMMERMAN,
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in enacting most of the popular initiative measures during this era,
were also behind the establishment of direct primary elections and
expanded popular suffrage.'16 These turn-of-the-century politicians
trusted the individual citizen but distrusted previous politicians and
political parties who they believed could only be checked through the
direct participation of voters.16' Population growth and urbanization
had made it difficult for citizens to hold officials accountable to the
extent possible in a simpler society.' 62 Without the possibility of direct
legislation, it was thought politicians could act without consulting the
people, effectively transferring sovereignty to a political party or a
63
special interest group.
Scholars who argue against citizen-lawmaking believe it would
weaken representative democracy,,64 or that most people would simply
not possess the level of competence necessary to sort through the
facts and vote intelligently on legislative measures.' 65 They fear that a
significant amount of decision-making would shift from legislators to
the citizenry, leading to immobilized and ineffective government; but
these general apprehensions have not proven justified in states where
legislative initiative exists. 66 Most state constitutions contain some
type of provision authorizing popular participation in the legislative
process through initiative, referendum, or both. States with initiative
and referendum provisions are often ahead of the nation in pioneering
helpful government aid programs, population-based reapportionment,
and laws aimed at protecting labor or breaking the power of special
160. For example, as early as 1902, as a result of efforts by local populist leader
William Simon U'Ren, Oregon gave voters the right to choose a candidate for state
office through a primary election in place of party conventions. MAGLEBY, supra note
158, at 8. These populist goals were also embraced by. the progressives. Id. at 9.
161. Id. at 9; ZIMMERMAN, supra note 159, at 38 (progressives in the Midwest
and West especially embraced the Initiative and Referendum as a way to break the
power of railroads in state legislatures).

162. ZIMMERMAN, supra note 159, at 38.
163. MAGLEBY, supra note 158, at 28.
164. ZIMMERMAN, supra note 159, at 160 (the legislature would defer their

responsibilities to the people).
165. See generally MAGLEBY, supra note 158, at 29. Jefferson, on the other
hand, believed that the people are the only safe repository of government power,
and that if they were thought to be insufficiently enlightened, "the remedy is not to
take the power from them, but to inform them by education."
159, at 40.

166. Compare

ZIMMERMAN

MAGLEBY,

SCHMIDT,

supra note

supra note 158, at 190 (predicting the opposite) with

Supra note 159, at 171 (criticizing the lack of facts to support Magleby's

conclusions). In fact, use of the direct initiative and petition referendum has involved
only "a small fraction of 1% of the decisions made by legislative bodies." Id.
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interests over legislatures; 67 in fact, most state initiatives involve
68
efforts to make government more honest and responsive.'
Regardless of the merits of direct legislative initiative, the case
for a right of constitutional revision by initiative is fairly strong.

While a right to directly amend the national constitution has never

been judicially recognized, 169 some argue that this ultimate right cannot
be denied if "we the people truly are sovereign."' 70 Article V is said
to be only a method for the government to cooperate in altering the

Constitution, i.e., public officials possess only authority expressly or
impliedly delegated to them by the people.' 7' Finally, the First Amendment does, after all, guarantee the right of the people to petition the
government.
There is, therefore, some support for the argument that Congress
would be justified in convening a constitutional convention to propose

amendments if a majority of the people were somehow to petition
Congress.1 72 On the other hand, when the people of California at-

167. SCHMIDT, supra note 159, at 15-22. Arizona passed population-based reapportionment in 1912, over 50 years before it was mandated by the Supreme Court.
Further, in 1912, initiatives in Arizona and Oregon gave women the right to vote,
nine years before there was a national suffrage amendment. Id.
168. Id. at 15 (for example, direct popular initiatives have allowed for the direct
election of Senators, home rule for municipalities, nomination of candidates in
primary elections, and line-item vetoes for governors).
169. Nor has a right been recognized to engage in direct legislation nationally.
Nevertheless, the significantly increased distrust of government over the past 20 years
has resulted in a political campaign for direct legislation nationally. MAGLEBY, supra
note 158, at 12. Polls taken in 1978 and 1981 concluded that most voters favor
establishing a national initiative. Id. at 13.
170. Akhil R. Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside
Article V, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1043 (1988) (arguing for an unenumerated right to
amend the constitution through ratification by a majority of the people). See also
note 134.
171. Edmund Pendleton, addressing the Virginia ratifying convention, pointed
(ironically) to Article V as "an easy and quiet method of reforming what may be
found amiss," whose introduction is "in the hands of our servants, who will interpret
it from motives of self-interest." Amar, supra note 170, at 1056 (quoting JONATHAN
ELLIOT,

3 THE DEBATES OF THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF

FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 37 (1836)). Professor Amar notes that nowhere is it
expressed that Article V is to be the only mode of alteration; he adds that, if it were,
it would violate the "inalienable right of a majority of the People to alter or abolish
their government," thus violating Madison's "first principles" - the theory of
popular sovereignty underlying the Revolution. Id. The legislative history of Article
V is also said to support these views. For example, Madison proposed that a prefix
be appended to the Preamble declaring "[tihat the people have an indubitable,
unalienable, and indefeasible right to reform or change their Government," but it
was eventually dropped as it was thought redundant. Id. at 1057.
172. Id. at 1065 n.81. But see Koehler v. Hill, 14 N.W. 738 (Iowa 1883); AFLTHE
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tempted to use the state initiative (which grants the power of direct
legislation) to call (indirectly) for a national constitutional convention,
the Supreme Court of California held that Article V prevents "the
people" from directing their state legislatures to petition Congress for
a Balanced Budget Amendment. 73 "The people" probably could not74
apply directly to Congress for the same reason, noted the Court.
Nonetheless, as with the states' petitions for conventions to propose
various constitutional amendments, vocal local demands for national
popular initiative can only provide added impetus for congressional
action.
VII.

THE CURRENT MOVEMENT TOWARD TERM* LIMITATION
AMENDMENTS IN THE STATES

Eighteen states allow citizens to initiate a state constitutional
amendment. 75 Citizens in three of these states were successful in 199076
1
in enacting amendments to limit the terms of their state legislators;
that year, one also added a term limitation for its members of

CIO v. March Fong Eu, 686 P.2d 609 (Cal. 1984) (state popular initiative can not

be used indirectly to petition Congress for a Constitutional Convention).
173. AFL-CIO, 686 P.2d at 620. "The question thus arises whether pro forma
action by a state legislature, acting under compulsion of an initiative measure, is
sufficient to comply with article V." Id.
[Tihe framers of the Constitution chose to give the voters no direct role in
The only conclusion we can draw from this fact
the amending process ....
is that the drafters wanted the amending process in the hands of a body
with power to deliberate upon a proposed amendment and, after considering
not only the views of the people but the merits of the proposition, to render
a considered judgment.
Id. at 621.
174. "[The people of the United States, in framing and ratifying the [Constitution], 'have excluded themselves from any direct or immediate agency in making
amendments to it'." Id. at 617-18 (quoting Barlotti v. Lyons, 189 P. 282, 283 (Cal.
1920)).

175. MAGLEBY, supra note 158, at 38-39 (17 without Mississippi, at the time this
work was published). See also ARIz. CONST. art. IV, pt. 1; ARK. CONST. art. 7; CAL.
CONST. art. IV, §1; CoLo. CONST. art. V, §1; FLA. CONST. art. I, §§ 3-5; ILL. CONST.
art. XIV, § 3; MASS. CONST. amend. art. 48; MICH. CONST. art. II, § 9; Mo. CONST.
art. 11I, §§49-53, 126(011-151); Miss. CONST. art. XV (1992); MONT. CONST. art. 1II,
§§4-8, and art. XIV, §§ 2, 9; NEB. CONST. art. III, §§ 2-4; NEV. CONST. art. XIX,
§§ 1-6; N.D. CONST. art. Ill, §§ 1-10, chap. 40-12; OHIo CONST. art. II, § 1; OKLA.
CONST. art. V, §§1-8; OR. CONST. art. IV, § 1; S.D. art. II1, § 1. Thirty-six states
allow statewide statutory referenda and all but Delaware require approval of the
electorate to amend the state constitution. ZIMMERMAN, supra note 159, at 38.
176. See CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 1.5; COLO. CONST art. V, § 3, art. IV, § 1;
OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 17A.
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congress.' 77 Fourteen states instituted (or added to) term limitation
provisions in 1992, as did another, Maine, in 1993.178
To get a measure on the ballot in states with constitutional
initiative, proponents must meet initial requirements, such as gathering
the requisite number of signatures. 79 In some cases, a citizen-initiated
proposal can serve merely as a nonbinding advisory opinion, 80 or it
may serve as an indirect initiative, i.e., if the citizens vote favorably
on it, the legislature must then decide whether to adopt or modify
it."' Some states provide for both the referendum8 2 and direct and/
or indirect initiative, while others allow neither.' In these latter
states, unfortunately, term limitation supporters have little recourse
other than to campaign for mandatory periodic convention call questions, vote for those call questions that come before the voters, lobby
for legislative amendment proposals, or urge the legislature to call
limited conventions to propose appropriate term limitation amend-

ments. 184
A.

STATES THAT HAVE PASSED LIMITS.

California, with its notoriously liberal initiative requirements,
passed Proposition 140 in November, 1990, limiting terms of all state
177. Colorado also limited the terms of its senators and representatives. See
COLO. CoNsT. art. XVIII, § 9a.
178. ARIZ. CONsT. art VII, § 18; Arkansas Term Limitation Amendment Petition
(Arkansas for Government Reform, Inc. 1993); CAL. ELEC. CODE § 25003 (West
1993) (adding limits to terms of members of Congress as well as state legislators;
FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4; MAINE CONST. art. 2, § 1, (1993); MICH. CONST. of 1963,
art II, § 10; MONT. CoNsT. art. IV, § 8(l)(d); Mo. CoNsT. art II, § 45(a); NEB.
CoNsT. art. XV, § 19; N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-01-13 (1992); OHIO CONST. art. V, §
8; OR. CONST. art II, § 20; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 15.1-02-12 (1992); WASH.
REV. CODE § 43.01 (1992); Wyo. STAT. § 22-5-102 (Michie 1992).
179. Signature requirements range from a low of 2% to a high of 15% of the
total votes cast in the preceding general election or of votes cast in a previous election
for a particular office, e.g., the last gubernatorial vote, with the median requirement
at 8%. MAGLEBY, supra note 158, at 41. Half of the states also require that the
signatures be geographically distributed throughout the state. This theoretically
reduces the ability of one urban area to set the agenda. Id.
180. ZIMMERMAN, supra note 159, at 40-41.
181. Id. at 41-45.
182. The referendum permits voters to ratify or reject measures the legislature
has already approved. Many statutory or constitutional provisions prescribe a mandatory referendum on certain types of issues. Id. at 41.
183. MAGLEBY, supra note 158, at 37 (23 states provide for neither).
184. See supra note 145. Of course, notwithstanding such efforts, it is doubtful
that many constitutional amendments of this sort will emerge directly from these
state legislatures.
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office-holders 85 Section 1.5 of the legislative article of the California
Constitution was amended to express the justification for term limitations:
The people find and declare that the Founding Fathers established a system of representative government based upon free,

fair, and competitive elections. The increased concentration of
political power in the hands of incumbent representatives has

made our electoral system less free, less competitive, and less

representative. The ability of legislators to serve unlimited
number of terms, to establish their own retirement system,
and to pay for staff . . . at state expense contribute heavily to
the extremely high number of incumbents who are reelected.

These unfair incumbent advantages discourage qualified can-

didates from seeking public office and create a class of career
politicians, instead of the citizen representatives envisioned by
the Founding Fathers. These career politicians become representatives of the bureaucracy, rather than of the people whom
16
they are elected to represent.

Soon after its ratification, the California legislature filed suit in
the state supreme court challenging the proposition; the plaintiffs
claimed it changed the constitution so much it was really constitutional
revision, which may only be proposed by the legislature or in a
constitutional convention.' 87 However, the California Supreme Court
determined that initiative-imposed term limitations did not violate the
constitution.' 8 The only other state to limit the terms of its state
legislators through a voter-initiated amendment prior to 1992 was
185. "The Political Reform Act of 1990" added to Article IV (the Legislative
article) the following: Sec. 1.5 (restricting incumbency); sec. 4.5 (abolishing the
retirement system); and an amended sec. 2 (setting terms for senate and assembly).
CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 1.5. See also Michael Barone & David Gergen, The Term
Limit Express, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Oct. 29, 1990, at 30 (the pension
system abolition was the result of voter outrage over the $20,000 pension paid to

jailed former State Senator Joseph Montoya and $68,000 a year paid to Sen. Alan
Cranston, who was under investigation for his role in the S&L debacle). A similar
proposition to additionally limit Congressional terms was passed in 1992. CAL. ELECT.
CODE § 25003 (West 1993).
186. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 1.5.
187. Legislature of State of Cal. v. March Fong Eu, 816 P.2d 1309 (Cal. 1991),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1293 (1992). The petitioner contended that Proposition 140
was in effect a constitutional revision rather than a mere amendment. Id. at 1316.
Revisions to the constitution can be achieved only by a constitutional convention and
a popular ratification or by the legislature. Id.
188. Id. at 1320 (resolving all doubts in favor of the initiative).

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 14

Oklahoma, the first state to do so. 1 9 The Oklahoma Constitution
now limits members of the legislature to a total of twelve years in
office whether or not they are consecutive. A total of seventeen states
now limit the terms of state legislators.' 90
Colorado was the first of 15 states to have passed an amendment
to the state constitution limiting the terms of both state legislators
and members of Congress. 91 The arguments on the ballot in favor of
the Colorado initiative were similar to those supporting the California
term limitation amendment, i.e., experience does not necessarily create
better lawmakers, and an initiative was necessary because those it
would affect probably would not bring it about themselves. 92 The
voter explanations acknowledged that by limiting the tenure of its
members of Congress, Colorado was denying its members and itself
the advantages of the seniority system, but suggested that Colorado's
sacrifice in this regard would be worthwhile if other states followed
suit. 19,

B. ARE STATE TERM LIMITATIONS CONSTITUTIONAL?
Lowe v. Kansas City Board of Election Commissioners 94 first

addressed the question of the constitutional legitimacy of popular
efforts to limit terms of State legislators. In Lowe, the plaintiffs, two
incumbent black city councilmen and voters in their districts, sought
189. Passed Sept. 18, 1990, as Question 632, the provision amends Art. V, by
OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 17A.
190. See supra note 14 for a list of the states.
191. Section 1 of article IV limits the terms for the governor, lieutenant governor,
secretary of state, treasurer, and the attorney general. Article V, section three, limits
state senators to two four-year terms and state representatives to four two-year terms.
Colorado's U.S. senators are limited to two six-year terms and House members to
six two-year terms. COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 9a. Article XVIII, section 9a, also
states that Colorado supports a nationwide limit on terms. Term limitations began
with the aid of State Senator Terry Considine after three measures previously
introduced in the General Assembly attempting to limit terms failed. LEGISLATIVE

creating section 17A. See

COUNCIL OF THE COLORADO GENERAL ASSEMBLY:

RESEARCH PUBLICATION

No. 350 (an

analysis of 1990 Ballot Proposals) (1990) (noting that the possibility that the portion
of the provision limiting terms of members of Congress might be repugnant to the
federal constitution) [hereinafter RESEARCH PUBLICATION]. Section 9a was added to
Article XVIII to outline and give reasons for the limitation on terms. This section
also provides that the section is severable if it is later found unconstitutional, but
that if this does occur the legislators should voluntarily observe the wishes of the
people. Id. See supra note 178 for a list of the states enacting limits since 1992.
192. See RESEARCH PUBLICATION, supra note 191.
193. Id.
194. 752 F. Supp. 897 (W.D.Mo. 1990).
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to invalidate a city charter amendment limiting the terms of council
members to eight consecutive years. The two councilmen would have
been ineligible for reelection under the new law. The plaintiff voters
claimed they were barred from electing the representatives of their
choice, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 95 The court found that while the new law would have
a temporarily negative impact on the districts represented by these
two black councilmen, this was merely coincidental; the law was
"founded on neutral principles" and could not be attacked merely
because it did not favor voters with perceived special needs. 196 The
court concluded that even though it may prevent districts from
reelecting their most experienced members, the law did not dilute the
voting power of any specific group, and therefore did not violate the
Fourteenth Amendment.

197

The California Legislature also filed suit challenging the constitutionality of Proposition 140, enacted in 1990, which placed term
limits on state legislators and other state officials. 19 Unlike the
Colorado provision, 199 the 1990 California Proposition did not place
limits upon California's representatives in Congress. The California
Supreme Court emphasized that Proposition 140 imposed a lifetime
ban and did not merely limit the number of consecutive terms that
could be served, 2 °° and then addressed the two specific challenges
under the California Constitution. First, the court considered whether
195. The voters also claimed violation of the Voting Rights Act. The court
dismissed the Voting Rights Act claim by reasoning that all Kansas City voters were
being deprived of the right to elect members who had served two terms, so minorities
were not being treated any differently than the rest of the electorate. Lowe v. Kansas
City Bd. of Election Comm'r, 752 F. Supp. 897, 899 (W.D. Mo. 1990). See also 42
U.S.C. § 1937(b) (1988).
196. Lowe, 752 F. Supp. at 900. There was no proof that one of the districts
represented by a minority actually had a majority of minorities, so plaintiffs tried to
correlate poverty with race since the districts were poor.
197. See also Miyazawa v. City of Cincinnati, 825 F. Supp. 816 (S.D. Ohio
1993) (term limitations for city council members held constitutional).
198. See CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 2(a) (enacted by Proposition 140). See also
Legislature of State of California v. March Fong Eu, 816 P.2d 1309 (Cal. 1991),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1292 (1992).
199. See supra note 191.

200. The court's decision was based on two primary elements, first "[nio
suggestion is made that only a consecutive term limitation was contemplated." March
Fong Eu, 816 P.2d at 1315. "Second, and more significantly, the opponents' ballot
arguments against Proposition 140 forcefully and repeatedly stressed the measure's
'lifetime ban'.

. .

." Id. "We conclude that Proposition 140's term limitations extend

over the lifetime of each affected office holder." Id. at 1316.
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the provision was so comprehensive that it amounted to constitutional
revision which cannot constitutionally be accomplished by initiative,
or was simply an amendment. 20 1 Concluding that the measure was
merely an amendment, 20 2 the court next sought to determine whether
the proposition violated the single-subject provision of the state
constitution, 20 3 ultimately holding that "the various provisions of
Proposition 140 are reasonably germane to the single subject of
incumbency reform and therefore do not violate the California Constitution."204

The California legislature had also contended that the lifetime
ban violated both the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the
Constitution by burdening the right to vote and the right to be a
candidate. 20 5 The petitioners claimed that "strict scrutiny" should be
applied; the respondent maintained that a voting rights "balancing
test" should be used. 20 6 Agreeing with the respondent, the Court
implemented the three-part test established in Anderson v. Celebrezze, 0 i.e., an evaluation of the nature of the injury to voters, the
state interests involved, and the narrowness with which the burden on
201. Id. See also CAL. CONST., art. XVIII, § 3 (establishing the method for
amending the constitution); CAL. CONST., art. XVIII, §§ 1, 2, 4 (establishing methods
of revising the constitution).
202. The Court noted:
It seems indisputable that Proposition 140 represents an attempt by the
people to 'alter or reform' their own government. To construe article XVIII
as vesting the Legislature with a power to veto such reform measures would
be seriously inconsistent with the democratic principles expressed in article
II. If, as petitioner predicts, Proposition 140 ultimately produces grave,
undesirable consequences to our governmental plan, the Legislature or the
people are empowered to propose a new constitutional amendment to correct
the situation. Resolving, as we must, all doubts in favor of the initiative,
we conclude that nothing on the face of Proposition 140 effects a constitutional revision.
March Fong Eu, 816 P.2d at 1320.

203. March Fong Eu, 816 P.2d at 1320. See also CAL. CONST., art. II, § 8,
(requiring that only a single subject be addressed in a proposition).
204. March Fong Eu, 816 P.2d at 1322.

205. "According to petitioners, this lifetime ban substantially burdens two
fundamental rights, namely, the right to vote and the right to be a candidate for
public office." Id.
206. "Petitioners, urging 'strict scrutiny' of the new measure, suggest that no
'compelling state interest' supports such a lifetime ban." Id. "Respondents, on the
other hand, assert the measure is valid under the balancing test

. .

." Id. See Anderson

v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983) (setting forth a three element balancing test for
voting rights cases).
207. 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
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voting has been tailored. 20 After weighing the necessary elements,
Proposition 140 was held not to violate the individual rights of voters
or candidates because:
In sum, it would be anomalous to hold that a statewide
initiative measure aimed at 'restor[ing] a free and democratic
system of fair elections,' and 'encourag[ing] qualified candidates to seek public office' (CAL. CONST., art. IV, § 1.5), is
invalid as an unwarranted infringement of the rights to vote
and to seek public office. We conclude the legitimate and
compelling interests set forth in the measure outweigh the
narrower interests of petitioner legislators and the constituents
29
who wish to perpetuate their incumbency. 0
Still, even though several courts have determined that stateimposed term limitations on state legislators do not violate the state
or federal Constitution, there has been no definitive decisions addressing the constitutionality of limitations placed on members of Congress. 210 Aside from the free speech and equal protection challenges
208. March Fong Eu, 816 P.2d at 1309.
Thus, Anderson v. Celebrezze .. . . requires us to consider three separate
elements in ascertaining the constitutionality of state laws restricting access
to the ballot: (1) the nature of the injury to the rights affected, (2) the
interests asserted by the state as justifications for that injury, and (3) the
necessity for imposing the particular burden affecting the plaintiff's rights,
rather than some less drastic alternatives.
Id. at 1324.
209. Id. at 1329. The court also rejected the argument that the proposition was
an unlawful bill of attainder. Id. at 1330.
Proposition 140 applies with equal force to all state legislators, current and
future. Although it is unquestionable the proponents sought to limit the
terms of incumbent legislators, including such long-term legislators as Brown
and Roberti, we find no evidence of an intent to single out and punish those
individuals for any supposed misconduct on their part.
Id. See also Nixon v. Administrators of Gen. Serv., 433 U.S. 425 (1977) (setting
forth three tests used to ascertain whether legislation constitutes a bill of attainder);
U.S. CoNsT., art. I, § 10 (prohibiting the state from passing a bill of attainder).
Finally, the court held that the portion of the proposition which restricted the
pensions of incumbent legislatures unconstitutionally infringed vested pension rights.
The court stated: "[W]e conclude that the pension restrictions of Proposition 140
are unconstitutional under the federal contract clause as applied to incumbent
legislators because they infringe on the vested pension rights of those persons."
March Fong Eu, 816 P.2d at 1335. See also U.S. CoNsT., art. I, § 10 (prohibiting
the states from passing any "law impairing the obligation of contracts").
210. See supra note 16 (describing the present status of litigation which should
ultimately result in the first United States Supreme Court decision on the constitutionality of state-imposed term limits on members of Congress).
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confronted in March Fong Eu,21 1 some recent commentators have
theorized that state term limitations on members of Congress violate
the federal Qualifications Clauses."' The controversy is over the
exclusiveness of the Clauses as set forth in the United States Constitution,2" 3 i.e., the language of the Qualification Clauses can be read
211. March Fong Eu, 816 P.2d at 1322; see supra notes 185-187, 196-207, and
accompanying text.
212. "Whatever one may think of the policy justifications for term limitations,
action by a state to add qualifications for membership in Congress runs afoul of the
Qualifications Clauses." Levy, supra note 37, at 1934 (concluding that the only valid
qualifications for members of Congress are those pronounced in the Constitution);
Eid & Koble, supra note 21 (stating that the founder's intended that additions to the
Qualifications Clauses could only be achieved through a textual amendment); Erik
H. Corwin, Limits on Legislative Terms: Legal and Policy Implications, 28 HARV.
J. ON LEcaS. 569 (1991) (claiming the Qualification Clause sets the maximum
requirements). See also J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION 453-63 (1891).
Several lower federal courts have also held that the states, like Congress, are without
power to add substantive requirements for election to Congress to those set forth in
the Qualifications Clauses. Public Citizen Inc. v. Miller, 813 F. Supp. 821, 831 (N.D.
Ga. 1993), aff 'd mem., 992 F.2d 1548 (1 1th Cir. 1993) ("states are ...denied the
power to act in this area"); Joyner v. Mofford, 706 F. 2d 1523, 1528 (9th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1002 (1983) ("the three qualifications contained in the [clauses]
are exclusive and ... the States may [not] require more of a [Congressional]
candidate"); United States v. Richmond, 550 F. Supp. 605, 607 (E.D. N.Y. 1982);
Dillon v. Fiorina, 340 F. Supp. 729, 731 (D. N.M. 1972) (invalidating a two-year
district residency requirement); Exon v. Tiemann, 279 F. Supp. 609, 613 (D. Neb.
1968) ("a State cannot require that a Representative live in the district from which
he was nominated.").
State courts have reached the same conclusion. Strong v. Breaux, 612 So. 2d
111, 112 (La. App. 1992); Shub v. Simpson, 76 A. 2d 332 (Md), appeal dismissed,
340 U.S. 881 (1950); Stumph v. Lau, 839 P.2d 120, 123 (Nev. 1992); Application of
Ferguson, 294 N.Y.S. 2d 174 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 294 N.Y.S. 2d 989 (App. Div.
1968) (disqualification of a candidate convicted of a felony held invalid); Chandler
v. Howell, 175 P. 569, 570 (Wash. 1918). But see Tiffanie Kovacevich, Constitutionality of Term Limitations: Can States Limit the Terms of Members of Congress?, 23
PACE L. REV. 1677 (1992) (rejecting the notion that term limitations are a violation
of the exclusive nature of the Qualifications Clause). See also U.S. CONST. art I, §
2; U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 3, cl.3.
213. Stephen J. Safranek, Term Limitations: Do the Winds of Change Blow
Unconstitutional?, 26 CREIGHTON L. REV. 321, 367 (1993) ("The Constitution, its
historical formation, and its application do not provide a certain resolution as to
whether the qualifications of representatives contained in the Constitution are exclusive. This ambiguity began with the first commentators on the Qualifications Clause,
and has continued unabated."). Compare Eid & Koble, supra note 21, at 31 ("The
fact remains that the framers made their choice more than two centuries ago when
they enumerated the membership requirements for federal representatives and ...
[additions] to the Qualifications Clauses can be achieved only by amending the text
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as exclusive (thereby pre-empting additional state-imposed requirements for members of Congress), or as merely establishing the minimum requirements for office (thus allowing for the setting of additional
standards i.e., federal Article I, § 4 "time, place and manner"
21 4
regulations, by the states).

The leading case interpreting the Qualifications Clauses is Powell
v. McCormack.215 But Powell was essentially restricted to resolving
of the Constitution.") with Roderic M. Hills, Jr., A Defense of State Constitutional
Term Limits on Federal Congressional Terms, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 97, 132 (1991)
("There is no unambiguous consensus about whether the Qualification Clauses should
allow state additions or exclude them").
214. See Hills, supra note 213, at 110 (concluding that state imposed limits on
Congress are constitutional).
On their face, these clauses are negative prohibitions against the election of
certain categories of legislators. [Such] negative language can naturally be
construed simply to impose a minimum set of qualifications that all federal
legislators must meet in order to be recognized as such by Congress.
Imposition of additional qualifications by state constitutions would be
consistent with such negative language as long as the state constitutions do
not waive the federal qualifications specifically enumerated.
Id. See also Levy, supra note 37, at 1930 ("The text of the Qualifications Clauses is
phrased in the negative .... This phrasing can be interpreted as disqualifying from

office people without these characteristics, rather than qualifying people who meet
these criteria").
Moreover, while the Constitution may bar the State from imposing substantive
restrictions on who may be elected, it does permit reasonable state regulation of how
elections are conducted. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4: The times, places and manner of
holding elections for Senators and Representatives shall be prescribed in each state
by the Legislature thereof; .... Term limitations for members of Congress might

be held legitimate under this provision. State ballot access laws have been upheld by
the federal courts on this basis. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 733 (1974) (law
denying ballot position to independent candidates who had a registered affiliation
with a political party within one year prior held to be "expressive of a general State
policy aimed at maintaining the integrity of the various routes to the ballot" and to
involve "no discrimination against independents"); American Party v. White, 415
U.S. 767 (1974); Hopfmann v. Connolly, 746 F.2d 97 (1st Cir. 1984), vacated in part
on other grounds, 471 U.S. 459 (1985) (party requirement that candidates receive
fifteen percent of the vote at the convention in order to be included on the ballot in
the state primary election); Public Citizen Inc. v. Miller, 813 F. Supp. 821 (N.D. Ga.
1993), aff'd per curiam, 992 F. 2d 1548 (1lth Cir. 1993); William v. Tucker, 382
F. Supp. 381 (M.D. Pa. 1974); Clark v. Rose, 379 F. Supp. 73 (S.D.N.Y. 1974),
aff'd, 536 F. 2d 56 (2nd Cir. 1974) (statute requiring authorization of party's State
Committee for non-member of party to run in its primary); Fowler v. Adams, 315
F. Supp. 592 (M.D. Fla. 1970), appeal dismissed, 400 U.S. 986 (1971). State election
laws which are general ground rules designed to make elections "fair and honest"
have been upheld. See Burdick v. Takuski, 112 S.Ct. 2059, 2063 (1992).
215. 395 U.S. 486 (1969) (holding that the House of Representatives could not
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the issue of Congress' power to impose additional qualifications of
prior good behavior on newly-elected members before they could be
seated. Congress has always had constitutional power to expel a sitting
member for misconduct occurring after her election and seating. It is

by no means clear that the policies the Court articulated in Powell
would be applied to state-imposed federal term limitations; 216 the
intentions of the framers on this subject are unclear, 217 especially when
deny Adam Clayton Powell his seat (that is, exclude him after his election rather
than expel him subsequent to his being seated) based on allegations of inappropriate
conduct). "A fundamental principle of our representative democracy is

. .

. 'that the

people should choose whom they please to govern them' (citation omitted) [but] this

principle [may be] undermined by limiting whom the people can select as by limiting

the franchise itself." Id. at 547.
216. State term limitation statutes "may have identical effects on the basic

interests protected by the Powell decision-the right of voters to 'choose whom they
please to govern them' and the intent of the Framers to establish a minimally
intrusive, fixed set of eligibility requirements in the Constitution." Corwin,- supra
note 212, at 581. On the other hand, the application of Powell could lead to the

conclusion "that any election regulation creates a qualification; for example, a
requirement that a candidate gather a given number of signatures before gaining
access to the ballot could be cast as imposing a fourth qualification. . . ." Gorsuch
& Guzman, supra note 17, at 354 (arguing that term limitations are not qualifications
but "manner" regulations and therefore do not violate the Qualifications Clauses).
The latter argument is even more persuasive in the case of modified term limit
proposals calling for members to "sit-out" one term periodically, especially given
the need under Celebrezze to enact the most narrowly tailored scheme necessary to
further the compelling state interest, a scheme least restrictive of the fundamental
interests of voters for incumbents.
217. See e.g., Safranek, supra note 213, at 366:
The Court in Powell was acting to protect the people from Congress. In so
acting, it fulfilled one of its traditional functions. However, if the Court
similarly decides a case involving the Colorado [or Washington] amendment,
it will be thwarting the decision of the people and protecting incumbent

representatives from the political process.

In other words, "the Court could decide a case involving the Colorado amendment
vis-a-vis Powell and extend its reasoning to prevent any qualifications from being
added by any entity. On the other hand, it could decide such a case under Powell
and say that the people have the power to add qualifications." Id. at 367. See also
Robert C. DeCarli, The Constitutionality of State-Enacted Term Limits Under the
QualificationsClauses, 71 TEX. L. REV. 865, 867 (1993) ("Powell and the authorities
cited therein indicate that Congress is prohibited from adding to the qualifications
required for congressional membership; it does not indicate that the people of the
states similarly lack the power."). But see Eid & Koble, supra note 21, at 45 ("[W]hile
the issue of state-imposed qualifications was not directly before the Court, the nature
of the materials used by the Powell Court strongly suggests that state-imposed
qualifications are invalid as well"); Brendan Barnicle, Comment, CongressionalTerm
Limits: Unconstitutionalby Initiative, 67 WASH. L. REV. 415, 430 (1992) ("[U]nder
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applied to state limitations which do not create a subsequent life-time
ban. Indeed, "modified" limitation schemes might prove to be acceptable "time, place and manner" restrictions under an Anderson v.
Celebrezze analysis, rather than additional qualifications. 218
C.

WHAT ABOUT ILLINOIS?

Illinois offers both a limited right of constitutional initiative21 9
and a system for placing a matter on the state ballot for nonbinding
referendum. 220 The state is one of only eighteen states in which citizens
enjoy the right to directly initiate amendments to the state constitution, 22 ' but Illinois is the only state in which the voters are limited to
amending the Legislative Article, 222 and only with regard to "structural
and procedural subjects" contained in that portion of the Constitu223
tion.
Powell, congressional term limit initiatives should also be struck down because they
are inconsistent with eighteenth century history and political practice, and the
Framers' philosophy"); Kovacevich, supra note 212, at 1702 ("The Powell Court's
endorsement of Hamilton's view of the exclusivity of the qualifications set out in the
[C]onstitution seems to foreclose the argument that these qualifications can be
supplemented by [state-imposed congressional] term limitations"); see also Levy,
supra note 37, at 1931 ("Although the specific holding in Powell was limited to
defining the extent of congressional authority, the Court did indicate that the negative
phrasing was inconsequential"); Gorsuch & Guzman, supra note 17, at 354-55 (stating
that Powell will apply to term limitations if they are held to create a qualification,
but arguing that term limitations merely affect the manner of an election).
218. See Gorsuch & Guzman, supra note 17.

219.

ILL. CONST.

art. XIV, § 3.

220. 10 ILCS 5/28 (1993).
221. States with some form of constitutional initiative as of 1993 are: Arizona,
Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Oregon, and South Dakota. See also Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct
Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1509 n.22 (1990); ILL. CONST. art. XIV, § 3. The
initiative process was first proposed in the United States at the 1892 Convention of

the Populist Party in Omaha, Nebraska. S. HECKNEY,

POPULISM: THE CRITICAL ISSUES

1, 6 (1971).
222. Eule, supra note 221; see infra note 224.
223. ILL. CONST. art. XIV § 3 reads:
SECTION 3. CONSTITUTIONAL INITIATIVE FOR LEGISLATIVE ARTICLE.
Amendments to Article IV of this Constitution may be proposed by a
petition signed by a number of electors equal in number to at least eight
percent of the total votes cast for candidates for Governor in the preceding
gubernatorial election. Amendments shall be limited to structural and procedural subjects contained in Article IV. A petition shall contain the text of
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A majority of the Committee on Suffrage and Constitutional
Amending at the 1970 Illinois constitutional convention agreed withthe critics of the initiative process and voted against a general initiative
provision for all parts of the constitution. 2 4 They feared abuse of the
process by single-issue or special interest groups, hasty and ill-conceived proposals, and inappropriate attempts to write ordinary legislation into the constitution.2 25 General initiative was deemed
unnecessary, in any event, in view of the recommended overall
liberalization of amending procedures, including a newly proposed
automatic periodic convention call provision. 22 6 On the other hand, a
minority of the Committee, which included the Chair and Vice-Chair,
considered the popular initiative a safeguard against legislative inac-

tion, a move toward popular government, and a legitimate means for

minority groups to bring significant issues before the voters; 227 but

their proposal for a general constitutional initiative was rejected by
the Convention by a vote of 60 to 44.228
the proposed amendment and the date of the general election at which the
proposed amendment is to be submitted, shall have been signed by the
petitioning electors not more than twenty-four months preceding that general
election and shall be filed with the Secretary of State at least six months
before that general election. The procedure for determining the validity and
sufficiency of a petition shall be provided by law. If the petition is valid
and sufficient, the proposed amendment shall be submitted to the electors
at that general election and shall become effective if approved by either
three-fifths of those voting on the amendment or a majority of those voting
in the election.
(emphasis added).
224. See Gordon V. Levine, The ConstitutionalInitiative and the Structure and
Procedures of the General Assembly, 11 J. MARSHALL J. OF P. & P. 387, 405-09
(1978); 7 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION at
2298 (1969-70)[hereinafter PROCEEDINGS]. There were fifteen delegate proposals on
revision at the 1970 convention, two of which dealt with the initiative method at the
same time as the legislative method, and one with amendment by initiative only.
ALAN S. GRATCH & VIRGINIA H. UBIK, BALLOTS FOR CHANGE: NEW SUFFRAGE AND
AMENDING ARTICLES FOR ILLINOIS 22 (1973).
225. PROCEEDINGS, supra note 224, at 2298-99.
226. Id. See also Levine, supra note 224, at 405-09.
227. PROCEEDINGS, supra note 224, at 2309-13.
228. PROCEEDINGS, supra note 224, at 587. Initiative was the only amending
subject on which the Committee could not reach a consensus; they were divided 5-4
against the proposal. GRATCH & UBIK, supra note 224, at 33. Chairman Tomei, ViceChair Shuman, and members Hendren and Sharpe favored the proposal out of faith
in the wisdom of the electorate and faith in their ability to wield the powers which
initiative would provide. Id. They filed a minority report and proposal. PROCEEDINGS,
supra note 224, at 2309-13. Those members opposed, the majority, believed the

1993:11

LEGISLA TIVE TERM LIMITA TION

The ultimate compromise on the issue was foreshadowed by
delegate Louis Perona's arguments in favor of initiative during the
floor debate over the minority proposal. He emphasized the importance of initiative for amending the legislative article, in particular,
since the legislature - and the convention delegates "tied" to the
legislature - could not be relied upon to institute changes in that
article. 229 There was, in fact, a proposal pending before delegate
Perona's Legislative Committee calling for initiative as a means of
amending "structural and procedural subjects" in the proposed Legislative Article of the new constitution.2 3 0 It resulted from the inability
of the convention to resolve the bitter controversy over single-member
versus multi-member legislative districts and the corollary practice of
cumulative voting, a scheme then unique to Illinois' General Assembly. 2 1' Compromising between allowing attempts to amend anything
in the constitution, potentially at the whim of a small pressure group,
and allowing no initiative at all, the delegates chose to recommend
initiative only in those narrow circumstances where the General Assembly was least likely to act. 2 2 Thus, the idea of "amendment by
popular initiative", limited to revision of the basic composition and
operation of the legislature, was new to the 1970 Illinois Constitution. 233 It was to be "a very limited initiative, ' ' 24 a necessary safety
electorate could not be trusted to reach wise decisions or they identified with the
established institutions of government-delegate Green did not want to upset the
existing political structure, delegate Miller believed in strong political parties, delegate
Lennon saw a threat to organized labor, and delegate Jaskula did not want to weaken
Chicago democrats. Id. Several of the convention delegates felt that such a procedure
negated the principles of representative government, accentuated the risk of constitutional change as a result of the changing fancy of temporary majorities, increased
the danger of oppression of minorities by emotional majorities, and would diminish
the significance of political party power. Id. Delegate John Alexander argued at
length that initiative was a product of an era of distrust of government, encroached
upon legislative authority and weakened legislative responsibility. Id. The minority
proposal failed. Coincidentally, contemporaneous proposals made at the 1969 special
session of the Virginia General Assembly to include the popular initiative in the
Constitution also were defeated. A.E. "DICK" HOWARD, II COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF VIRGINIA 1171 (1974).
229. GRATCH &.UBIK, supra note 224,

230. Id.

at 48.

231. Levine, supra note 224, at 387-88.

232. Id. at 412. The delegates simply recognized that the legislature has a vested
interest in its own structure, and that legislators would be disinclined to propose

amendments reducing their number or changing the method by which they have been
elected, changes which could effectively do away with their jobs.
233. However, it was not new to Illinois constitutional politics. In fact, one of
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mechanism through which Illinois voters could amend the legislative
article regardless of the inclinations of the state legislature. 2" It was
not to be used for general or essentially "statutory" matters, or for
the advocacy of issues which could become the focus of emotional
political campaigns.

23 6

The provision has been interpreted in four relatively important
decisions. In the first, Coalition for Political Honesty v. State Board
of Elections, 237 the plaintiffs included several delegates to the 1969
constitutional convention. 23 8 They were represented by Samuel Witwer,
the major reasons for the failure of the Fifth Constitutional Convention, called to
order on January 6, 1920, was the many frustrating recesses in the convention's work
caused by conflict over the initiative: officially in session for two years and nine
months, the delegates spent only 140 days in actual convention work. See JANET
CORNELIUS, CONSTITUTION MAKING IN ILLINOIS

103-05 (1972).

The convention adjourned when neither side could agree or communicate
with the other, especially on matters of legislative apportionment and the
question of the initiative and referendum. [The] initiative and referendum
had been one of the most popular progressive [era] attempts to give the
public more control over the legislative process. By 1915 twenty-one states
had adopted it in some form. Illinois voters had also advocated its adoption
in advisory referendum in 1902 and 1910, and in a similar advisory referenda
when choosing convention delegates [to the Fifth Constitutional Convention]
in November 1919. However, the initiative and referendum issue divided
[political] parties and reform groups on a Cook County - downstate basis.
[The] convention [ultimately] voted 52 to 20 not to include a provision for
[initiative]. Some Chicago delegates were so incensed [that they immediately
moved for adjournment] claiming that this convention had failed in its
purpose. [The] following day the Chicago Herald and Examiner wrote that
"it is generally conceded in Springfield that when the convention buried the
I and R it ended all hope for the new constitution, indelibly okayed by the
interests." (citation omitted)
Id. The proposed 1922 constitution failed overwhelmingly at the polls, therefore, in
large measure due to the failure of the delegates to include popular initiative
provisions. Id. In fact, "[t]here is no record in the history of American politics that
equals this for an uprising of the people at the ballot box on a local issue". Id. at
115..
234. Id.at 118.
235. See, e.g., Brian W. Allen, Coalition for Political Honesty v. State Board
of Elections - Constitutional Amendments by Popular Initiative Must Pertain to Both
Structural and Procedural Subjects in the Legislative Article, 1978 U. ILL. L.F. 122,

131 (1978).
236. Id. at 132. See also

PROCEEDINGS,

237. 359 N.E.2d 138 (I1. 1976).

supra note 224, at 2298-99.

238. Initially, the Coalition's petition drive to place their initiative on the ballot
met with broad public support as the proposals attempted to regulate the ethical
conduct of legislators. However, many of those intimately connected with the

1993:11

LEGISLATIVE TERM LIMITATION

president of the 1969 convention. Plaintiffs sought to enjoin the
expenditure of public funds in order to determine the validity and
sufficiency of the initiative petition in question, 23 9 and to enjoin the
State Board of Elections from arranging for and conducting an
election on the three proposed amendments which were the subject of
the petition. The Coalition for Political Honesty, initiator of the
petitions, intervened and sought a writ of mandamus directing the
State Board of Elections to certify the proposed amendments. The
proposals would have amended article IV so that (1) no member of
the General Assembly could receive compensation from any other
governmental entity during his term as a member of the General
Assembly, (2) no member of the General Assembly could vote whenever there was a conflict of interest on a particular bill, and (3)
advance salary payments could no longer be made to legislators. 24°
convention, including the plaintiffs, thought that it was not the intent of the
convention to allow substantive changes by initiative and that if ethical reform could
be initiated under article XIV, sec. 3, "then through artful drafting any subject, even
those covered by the other articles of the constitution, could be the subject of a
proposed amendment by initiative." Levine, supra note 224, at 393-95. "This would
make § 3 a general constitutional initiative provision, an idea firmly rejected by the
convention." Coalition for Political Honesty v. State Board of Elections, 359 N.E.2d
138 (Ill. 1976) [hereinafter Coalition 1]; PROCEEDINGS, supra note 224, at 2298.
239. The parties in Coalition I (and Gertz v. State Bd. of Elections, the
companion case) stipulated that for the State Board of Elections to perform its
statutory duties would require an expenditure of approximately $250,000.00 and, if
the petitions were certified by them to the county clerks and board of election
committees, they would then have been charged with conducting a constitutional
referendum and canvassing the results of such a referendum at a cost of approximately
$1,500,000.00. Coalition 1, 359 N.E.2d at 138 (Brief for Plaintiff, at 41-42); Levine,
supra note 224, at 391-92.
240. Coalition , 359 N.E.2d at 139-40. Several of the delegate-plaintiffs in
Coalition I believed that propositions One and Two violated the federal and state
constitutions. Proposition One was thought to violate the equal protection clauses of
both documents because it arbitrarily and unreasonably excluded from eligibility for
election to the Illinois General Assembly all persons wishing to serve in any other
governmental entities, even without compensation. Proposition One was also thought
to violate both due process clauses by placing an undue burden upon legislators who
could serve in other public capacities only if gratuitously. Proposition One also was
said to violate the U.S. "guarantee clause" and the Illinois preamble by abridging
the right of the citizens to elect persons of their own choosing as their representatives.
Finally, Proposition Two was found wanting because plaintiffs felt it established a
standard of eligibility to vote on bills that was so ambiguous and capable of arbitrary
interpretation that it would be void for vagueness under the due process clauses.
Coalition 1, 359 N.E.2d at 138 (Brief for Plaintiff, at 13-15). The trial court held
that Propositions One and Two were unconstitutional. Levine, supra note 224, at
393-95.
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The majority of the Illinois Supreme Court found the controversy
ripe for review, reasoning that before it can be submitted to the
electorate, any proposed amendment must first comply with both the
statutory procedures for placing initiatives on the ballot and the
241
constitutional limitations on the form of proposed amendments.
The court found that while each of the three proposals arguably
related to procedural matters, none of them related to the structure
of the General Assembly; in order to comply with the requirements
of the initiative provision, the court held, any amendment proposed
must be intended to revise both "structural and procedural" matters.
This construction was necessary to further the intent of the convention
241. Coalition 1, 359 N.E.2d at 141-42 (citing Allen v. Powell, 244 N.E.2d 596,

597 (111.1969) ("[llnjunctive relief will be granted to prevent a waste of public funds
for the holding of an election under an unconstitutional election statute"); Niebling
v. Town of Moline, 131 N.E.2d 535 (I11.1956); Moran v. Bowley, 179 N.E. 526 (I11.
1932); McAlpine v. Dimick, 157 N.E. 235 (Ill. 1927) (injunction available to prevent
a waste of public funds); PROCEEDINGS, supra note 224, at 2711-12 (comments of
delegates Perona and Netsch). The court noted that approximately $1,750,000.00 of
public money would be spent to determine the sufficiency of the petition and to
conduct the election on the three proposed amendments. Thus, postponing consideration of the constitutionality of the amendments until after the proposals had been
submitted, and then determining that the proposals did not meet the requirements in
section 3 for amendments, would mean that almost $2 million in public funds would
be wasted. Coalition 1, 359 N.E.2d at 141-42. It has long been settled in Illinois and continues to be the case - that courts have no jurisdiction to enjoin the holding
of an election unless injunctive relief is necessary to prevent waste of public funds
which would result from holding an election under an unconstitutional election
statute, or where the election would violate the state constitution. Jordan v. Officer,
508 N.E.2d 1077 (I11.App. Ct. 1987); Fletcher v. City of Paris, 35 N.E.2d 329, 331
(Ill. 1941). Other jurisdictions have also held it proper to enjoin the holding of
citizens' referenda on proposed amendments which did not comply initially with the
amending provisions of their constitutions. See, e.g., McFadden v. Jordan, 196 P.2d
787 (Cal. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 918 (1949); Mathews v. Turner, 236 N.W.
412 (Iowa 1931); Cohen v. Attorney Gen. 237 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1968); Moore v.
Brown, 145 N.E.2d 525 (Ohio 1957) (cited in Coalition I, 359 N.E.2d at 142). In
pre-election challenges to proposed amendments, a standard of strict compliance w
all specified prerequisites, rather than a standard of substantial complianc-, is
appropriate. See, e.g., Coleman v. Pross, 246 S.E.2d 613 (Va. 1978). The Illinois
Supreme Court characterized the issue as follows:
We are not concerned with an election or a legislative referendum, but
rather, with the question of whether proposed amendments to our constitution satisfy the Constitution's own requirements for its amendment. . ..
Any offered amendment[s] under the initiative obviously must comply with
the procedure and the limitations on amendments set out in section 3 before
it can be submitted to the electorate.
Coalition I, 359 N.E.2d at 141.
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delegates, which was to limit the initiative to only the most "basic
242
qualities" of the legislative branch-size, organization, and the like.
Otherwise, the Court suggested, practically any proposed change in
the article-such as the proposals then before the Court-might easily
243
be construed as either structural or procedural in character.
The court reasoned that "[the] language [structural and procedural] should be given its plain and commonly understood meaning
unless it is clearly evident that a contrary meaning was intended." 2"
Unfortunately, while "and" obviously has a "plain meaning"-it
ordinarily signifies the conjunctive and the court simply reaffirms that
242. Coalition I, 359 N.E.2d at 145. The delegates were trying to avoid two
serious weaknesses found in the constitutional initiative process in other states: (1)
permitting legislation by constitutional amendment, and (2) embroiling the constitutional amending process in highly emotional and complex issues which often cannot
be clearly and adequately explained to the voters. Id. See also PROCEEDINGS, supra
note 224, at 2298-99. Of course, even assuming that the framers' desire to avoid
these evils implies that the initiative is to be used narrowly, for example to modify
only "basic qualities" of the legislature, it is not clear that "basic qualities" are only
those which relate to structural and procedural matters. Much about either the
structure or procedures of the legislature discussed in the legislative article can be
characterized as "basic qualities."
243. Coalition 1, 359 N.E.2d at 144. The concern was that amendments could
be proposed such as "The General Assembly shall set the legal drinking age at 30"
or "Legislators in favor of legalized abortion shall not vote on abortion bills." See
Allen, supra note 235, at 129-31. Yet, this still does not mean that the only alternative
is an exceedingly narrow conjunctive reading of "structure and procedure." The
approach of the CBA case, for example, infra notes 263-269 and accompanying text,
was to initially focus on the main thrust of the proposed amendment. Since that
thrust was indirectly to modify another article, i.e., make substantive changes in law
or public policy, the proposal was held unconstitutional for that reason rather than
because there was no effort to amend a structural and procedural subject. This
approach should be equally as effective in furthering framers' intent as the Coalition
I test. It avoids the problematic conjunctive interpretation of Coalition I when the
problem before the court is a substantive amendment to another article or involves
improper "constitutional legislation" (an effort to make enduring changes in substantive law), the real problem with at least two of the proposals in Coalition I. See
infra note 257 and accompanying text (Justice Schaefer's dissenting formulation of
the proper test in Coalition 1).See also supra notes 226 (delegates' intent was that
ordinary statutory matters would be inappropriate), 237 (amendments to other articles
would be inappropriate), and 241 ("constitutional legislation" was to be avoided)
and accompanying text.
244. Coalition I, 359 N.E.2d at 143 (emphasis added). See, e.g., Lake County

v. Rollins, 130 U.S. 662, 670 (1889) ("If the words convey a definite meaning which
involves no absurdity, nor any contradiction of other parts of the instrument, then
that meaning, apparent on the face of the instrument, must be accepted, and neither
the courts nor the legislature have the right to add to it or take from it.").
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fact here-it is still not "clear" whether the three proposals of
Coalition I are or are not "structural and procedural subjects".
Seemingly, plain statutory language will occasionally become ambiguous in application. At that point, the "plain meaning" rule is no
longer pertinent. Giving the same meaning to language in inappropriate as well as appropriate circumstances may result in consequences
not intended by the framers, consequences which are unfair or absurb.
When ambiguity exists-for example, when two different members of
the audience to whom the statute is addressed reasonably disagree on
whether that measure would modify a "structural or procedural
subject"-both internal and external context usually must be taken
into account to weigh the chances of absurd, unfair or unreasonable
2 45
results should one interpretation be adopted as compared to another:
[Interpretation] involves far more than picking out dictionary
definitions . . . Consideration of the context and the setting is
indispensable properly to ascertain a meaning. In saying that
a verbal expression is plain or unambiguous, we mean little
more than that we are convinced that virtually anyone competent to understand it, and desiring fairly and impartially to
ascertain its signification, would attribute to the expression in
its context a meaning such as the one we derive, rather than
any other, and would consider any different meaning, by
comparison, strained, or [unlikely]. .. . Implicit in the finding
of a plain, clear meaning of an expression in its context, is a
finding that such meaning is rational and "makes sense" in
246
that context.
245. See REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES
229-33 (1975) ("[T]he [plain meaning] rule has sometimes been used to read ineptly
expressed language out of its proper context, in violation of established principles of
meaning and communication.") (emphasis added). Id. at 231 (it is important to take
external context into account when the same audience could easily interpret the same
language in more than one way).
246. Hutton v. Phillips, 70 A.2d 15, 17 (Del. Super. Ct. 1949) (emphasis added).
Professor Dickerson has suggested that "[tihe important interpretation problem....
is to determine, in the light of the text and its proper context, whether [there are]
facts suggesting that a normal reading of the language would produce an absurdity,
an inequity, or unreasonableness [and whether these facts] create a presumption
strong enough that the most plausible alternative is to conclude that the legislature
did not mean what it expressly said. This is a matter of judgment under the
circumstances. [The] presumption against absurdity is strong, [and] the presumptions
against unfairness and unreasonableness [are] usually weak." DICKERSON, supra note
245, at 232 (emphasis added). Thus, in holding to the conjunctive view, the majority
in Coalition I apparently found that, at worst, the conjunctive reasoning produced
"unreasonable" but not "absurd" results. Coalition 1, 359 N.E. 2d at 143.
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Would virtually anyone competent to understand it view the
phrase "structural and procedural subjects" as conjunctive in the
context of Coalition I, and view any different meaning as being
strained? The late Justice Schaefer did not. Indeed, had the majority
emphasized the ambiguity of the situation, interpreting the pivotal
phrase in the external context of framers' probable intent with regard
to the objectives of the propositions in question, the balance easily
could have "tipped" toward the disjunctive position. Even with a
disjunctive interpretation of "and," at least two of the three propositions would still have been unconstitutional. 247 Nevertheless, the call
on the question was the Coalition I majority's to make, 248 i.e., it was
reasonable even though the court legitimately retained doubts about
its decision:
Justice Brandeis is reported to have observed that some questions can be decided, even if not completely answered. The
process of decision, he said, does not demand that one point
of view be accepted as entirely right and the other rejected as
entirely wrong. It is sufficient that the scale of judgment tips.
We judge that the scale has tipped in favor of the plaintiffs'
position. 249
247. See infra note 256 (Justice Schaefer, using the phrase in the disjunctive in
his dissent, still found only one of the propositions constitutional).
248. Especially if the majority felt compelled, as was probably the case, by the
fact that the disjunctive construction would still have permitted the apparently
offensive Proposition II (on "conflict" voting) and that, under that construction,
the only way to void that provision would be to reach the federal constitution
questions in the case. Given conflicting state authorities, and perhaps in an effort to
evade federal review of this important Illinois decision on the basis of unsettled
federal constitutional law, the Illinois Supreme Court chose to characterize the entire
conflict as one that could be settled on an adequate and independent state ground.
That is, the only way to completely resolve Coalition I consistent with the framers'
intent and without inviting problematic federal review was by requiring a conjunctive
interpretation of "structural and procedural," at least in the context of the amending
propositions then at issue. Indeed, the unusual and unique circumstances in Coalition
I, and the confusion they might engender for future interpretation of § 3, may have
compelled Justice Schaefer's dissent.
249. Coalition I, 359 N.E.2d at 147. It should also be noted that, in fairness to
the majority, while Justice Schaefer made convincing mention in his dissent of a
legislative history of prior rejection by the convention delegates of the majority's
interpretation here, the rejection - even express rejection - of a proposed amendment to a pending bill, standing alone, is normally inadequate as a basis for inferring
legislative intent. Id. at 149. "[An] amendment's rejection should not be given
significance as such, nor should legislative rejection of an amendment imply that the
body intended to reject the apparent effect of the measure." Otto J. Hetzel, Instilling
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Nevertheless, while the plaintiffs may have been correct in arguing
that a conjunctive construction of "structural and procedural" was
consistent with (and essential for) a decision that all the "ethics"
proposals challenged in Coalition I were not proper subjects for
popular initiative;2 50 but a ruling to this effect is arguably obiter
dictum wherever the thrust of any proposed amendment is modification of another constitutional article or is to provide constitution
status for substantive legislation." 1
Much of the majority's argument in support of their conjunctive
construction (admittedly) was weak. For example, it would not necessarily be true-as the majority claimed-that the constitutional
phrase "structural and procedural" would have been "surplusage"
without a conjunctive interpretation. There are provisions in Article
IV that contain neither substantive nor procedural subjects. In addition to the obvious fact that "and" usually means "and," there is
only one other obvious argument for a conjunctive interpretation,
one based on internal context-in that the framers used the word
"and" six times in article XIV, section 3 (five times unmistakably to
convey "in addition to"). 25 2 But though this would appear to argue
for an intended conjunctive meaning in the clause in question, it is
Legislative Interpretion Skills in the Classroom and the Courtroom, 48 U. PITT. L.
REV. 663, 676 (1987). There are many reasons for saying no to an amendment,
reasons unrelated to the interpretive point in issue. "At best, express rejection is
useful only for the purposes of judicial lawmaking and only if [the] inherent ambiguity
has been reliably resolved by the other circumstances." Coalition 1, 359 N.E.2d at
147. See also Pine Hill Coal Co. v. United States, 259 U.S. 191, 196 (1922) (Holmes,
J.) ("It is a delicate business to base speculations about the purposes or construction
of a statute upon the vicissitudes of its passage.").
250. "And" is, after all, presumptively a coordinate conjunction, signifying the
relation of addition. One finds in numerous cases comments to that effect. See, e.g.,
Gar Creek Drainage Dist. v. Wagner, 100 N.E. 190, 198 (I1. 1912):
It is true that the word "and" is sometimes substituted for "or" in the
construction of statutes [to] effectuate the intentions of the parties, but this
is only in cases where the intention is clearly manifested, and it is apparent

that to construe the word according to its real meaning would involve an
absurdity or produce an unreasonable result.
See also Levine, supra note 224, at 403. On the other hand, the clear legislative
purpose was to allow for those "basic changes" the legislature would not be expected

to initiate itself. Thus, to not construe "and" as "or" so as to allow certain proposals
on the ballot very well might "produce an unreasonable result" (one inconsistent
with the easily discernable legislative intent to allow for change in areas where
legislative inaction would be expected). Id.

251. See infra note 256 (Justice Schaefer found a conjunctive construction
unnecessary in voiding at least two of the three propositions because they were simply
substantive amendments).
252. But see, e.g., Levine, supra note 224, at 404 n.73 (this argument was
neither raised by the parties nor discussed by the court).
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not necessarily persuasive evidence. 253 The disjunctive interpretation
would only be "unreasonable" in terms of the relatively minor matter

of internal context; the conjunctive interpretation would be much
more unreasonable in external context. The conjunctive construction,
however, was required in Coalition I because while it was only one

way to fulfill the drafters' intent (that initiative not be used to enact
ordinary legislation) with regard to two of the propositions, it was
the only way to evade federal review of Proposition II, the remaining
proposition. The majority could not have believed that an "or"
construction was incorrect or would produce significantly different,
absurd or unreasonable results as a general proposition.
Justice Schaefer's dissent illuminates this interpretation. In con-

trast to the majority, Schaefer argued that the plain meaning of
"structural and procedural" in this context was "structural or pro-

cedural". 2 4 He did not agree that any proposed change in the
legislative article would be either structural or procedural in character.
Some of the provisions of article IV, he pointed out, plainly do not
relate to either procedural or structural matters. 255 Schaefer concluded
that requiring proposed amendments to affect both matters which are
structural (the composition or organization of the General Assembly)
and procedural (the methods by which the General Assembly conducts
its business) unreasonably restricted the use of the initiative far beyond
the intent of the convention delegates. 25 6 He suggested a less restrictive
test: "if a proposal amended any part of the legislative article, but
did not address an issue of substantive law [or constitutional policy],
the proposal would comply with the restrictions on the use of the

253. But see id.
254. Coalition I, 359 N.E.2d at 148. Justice Schaefer used two sentences as
examples: "First year students are limited to mathematics and foreign language
courses does not mean that mathematics and foreign language are taught in the same
course, and the menus will be limited to beef and chicken dishes does not mean that
each dish must contain both beef and chicken." Id.
255. Id.
256. Justice Schaefer said that he could "not find anything in the proceedings
[of the convention] which suggests that no change in any of the numerous procedural
provisions of article IV can be brought about by initiative unless the same amendment
brings about a change in the structure of the legislative body." Coalition 1, 359
N.E.2d at 148. Moreover, he argued "[tihe fact is that the constitutional convention
had presented to it, but failed to adopt, a revision of the sentence in question which
would have expressed the construction now adopted by the majority of this court."
Id. at 149. See also Allen, supra note 235, at 131 (some provisions in the legislative
article-perhaps of lesser importance to the legislators-simply do not concern either
the structure and procedure of the legislature and would thus not be amendable by
popular initiative in any event).
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initiative. ' 25 7 This approach would be equally consistent with furthering the delegates' intent as was the majority's, and voters would still
25
not be able to legislate by initiative under this test. 1
Finally, addressing the quite significant question of whether the
specific amendments challenged in Coalition I actually sought change
regarding "structural and procedural subjects," Justice Schaefer found
that Propositions One and Three related neither to structural nor
procedural subjects. Proposition Two (preventing a member from
voting on a bill that posed a conflict of interest), however, did concern
a matter of procedure, and since it could affect the composition of
the General Assembly, it was a structural subject as well 25 9 and should
have been allowed on the ballot.
In any event, regardless of the correctness of its approach, after
Coalition I, it seemed the only definitely proper subjects for initiative
in the future would be questions of single member as opposed to
multi-member districts, cumulative voting, bicameralism as opposed
26
to unicameralism, the size of the legislature, and reapportionment. 0
Hence; in Coalitionfor PoliticalHonesty v. State Board of Elections
11,261 the Illinois Supreme Court held, without much detailed analysis,
that reducing the size of the house of representatives, abolishing
cumulative voting, and electing representatives from single-member
districts were all matters of structural and procedural change and
could be submitted to the voters as a single amendment. 262
257. Coalition 1, 359 N.E.2d at 153. There are other reasonable interpretations
of "structural and procedural subjects" which also render that language far less
restrictive. It has been suggested, for example, that it was the intent of the Convention
Committee on the Legislature to limit proposed amendments under this provision
(originally proposed by that Committee) to those which affected primarily the
structure of the legislature and to those:
merely incidental procedural changes necessitated by major structural changes.
One way of [making the second sentence of article XIV, section 3 not seem
superfluous] would be a sentence reading 'amendments proposed by petition
shall be limited to the structure of the General Assembly, and to procedural
provisions affected by changes in structure' (citation omitted).
Levine, supra note 224, at 408-09 n.85. This view of the meaning of this language is
quite similar to the more recent judicial view of the meaning of "structural and
procedural" found in Lousin v. State Bd of Elections, 438 N.E.2d 1241 (Il1. App.

Ct. 1982). See infra note 263 and accompanying text.
258. See Allen, supra note 235, at 129.
259. Coalition 1, 359 N.E.2d at 149.

260.
261.
262.
voters in

See Levine, supra note 224, at 412.
415 N.E.2d 368 (Ill. 1980).
Id. at 379. The court also held that submission of these questions to the
a single proposition would not violate article III, section 3, of the 1970
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The judicial emphasis on promoting the framers' intent with
regard to popular initiative found in Coalition I and Coalition II was
evident again in 1982. The Illinois Court of Appeals affirmed a trial
court injunction against an election on a proposed amendment which
would have allowed the use of popular initiative for enacting ordinary
legislation. The amendment was held to violate Article IV § 3 because
it would impermissably vest legislative power in the electors, 263 and it
did not relate "to the structure, and, of necessity, incidentally [affect]
the procedure of the General Assembly. ' ' 26 This result followed, of
course, from the fact that proposals to use popular initiative for
Illinois Constitution ("All elections shall be free and equal"), which has been held
to prohibit the combining of separate and unrelated questions in a single proposition
in order to attempt to compel voters to approve the whole proposition even though
they would be expected to reject one of the questions. Village of Deerfield v. Rapka,
296 N.E.2d 336 (Ill. 1973). "If there is a reasonable, workable relationship to the
same subject, the proposal may be submitted for approval or rejection by the voters."
Coalition for Political Honesty v. State Board of Elections II, 415 N.E.2d 368 (Ill.
1980) [hereinafter Coalition II]. Coalition II also involved an unsuccessful technical
challenge to the sufficiency of the petition. The court ruled that while the General
Assembly may be constitutionally authorized to establish procedures for determining
the validity and sufficiency of an initiative petition, any such procedure cannot
unnecessarily be used to restrict the people's fundamental initiative rights. The court
justified this ruling by recognizing and affirming the Convention's Legislative Committee's belief that: "(1) the greatest virtue in having this [initiative] provision rests
in the potential for keeping the General Assembly more responsive on matters directly
and vitally affecting them; (2) voters can better decide on the merits of proposals
suggesting changes in the Legislative Article since they are not directly and personally
involved, and (3) this is a method to circumvent a legislature which might be
dominated by interests opposing legislative changes." Coalition II, 415 N.E.2d at
375 (quoting PROCEEDINGS, supra note 224, at 1399-1400) (Report of the Legislative
Committee, Part III). Accordingly, the State Board of Elections could not exclude
from consideration entire sheets of petition signatures because of the presence of one
or more "non-conforming" signatures, signatures only made invalid by a revision of
the Election Code enacted during the petition drive. Id. at 373-74. The single proposed
amendment was approved by the voters in November, 1980, and took effect beginning
with the November 1982 election.
263. Noting Justice Schaefer's dissent in Coalition I, the court held that "the
initiative process [cannot] be used to alter or change the power of the legislature."
Lousin, 438 N.E.2d at 1246. "The Court simply found

. . .

that the initiative process

was not designed to go that far." Chicago Bar Ass'n v. State Board of Elections,
561 N.E.2d 50 (111. 1990) [hereinafter CBA].
264. Lousin, 438 N.E.2d at 1246 (emphasis added). The plaintiffs in this case,
as in Coalition I, were participants in the Sixth Illinois constitutional Convention.
They sought to enjoin the Board of Elections from spending approximately
$1,053,000.00 in public funds to determine the validity and sufficiency of the initiative
petition, and from arranging for and conducting an election on the proposed
amendment.
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either general constitutional revision or ordinary legislation were
defeated at the Constitutional Convention.2 65 However, since there
was really no need to construe the phrase "structural and procedural
subjects" in this context (because the proposal obviously concerned
neither a structural nor a procedural subject in the legislative article,
but rather that article's fundamental'grant of legislative power itself),
the Court's articulated justification for its holding (a new more liberal
formulation of the Coalition I conjunctive test) was noteworthy. 266
The most recent attempt to alter the constitution by voter initiative was rejected by the Illinois Supreme Court in Chicago Bar Ass'n
v. State Board of Elections.2 67 CBA involved the Tax Accountability
Amendment, which would have required a super-majority (three-fifths
of the legislature) for approval of revenue measures (which would
include tax increases). In addition to reviewing the three earlier court
decisions,2 68 the court re-examined the debates of the Illinois Constitutional Convention of 1970, and reiterated its findings in earlier
cases-that the delegates sought to avoid use of the initiative process
to pass amendments of a statutory nature 269 or as a forum for debating
highly emotional and complex issues.270 Ultimately, the Illinois Supreme Court ruled that the Tax Accountability Amendment could not
be placed on the ballot because, regardless of whether a substantive
and procedural change would be effectuated, it concerned revenue, a
substantive subject not found within Article IV. 271
Unfortunately, the court in CBA failed to explain the present
status of the Coalition I conjunctive test; it was not a question that
court had to reach. 272 By not speaking to the structural and procedural
265. PROCEEDINGS, supra note 224, at 587 (roll call on Suffrage and Constitutional Amending Committee Minority Proposal No. IA).
266. See infra notes 274-276.
267. CBA, 561 N.E.2d at 50.
268. Coalition II, 415 N.E.2d at 368; Coalition 1, 359 N.E.2d at 138; Lousin,
438 N.E.2d at 1241.
269. The delegates clearly did not intend that the initiative process be used in
lieu of legislative action. CBA, 561 N.E.2d at 54. There were two perceived weaknesses

the delegates wanted to avoid: (1') legislation by initiative; and (2) an initiative process
which could become embroiled in highly emotional, complex issues which cannot be
adequately and clearly explained to voters. Id.
270. To avoid "constitutional legislation" and turmoil over complex issues "[aill

proposed Constitutional amendments submitted through use of [the initiative] would
be expressly limited to subject matter specifically contained in the [I]egislative

[a/rticle." Id. (emphasis added).
271. CBA, 561 N.E.2d at 55-56.
272. Id. at 55 ("[wle need not focus on that issue here").
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effects the Tax Accountability Amendment would have had on the
legislative article; however, the court left in question the continuing
weight of the prior strict conjunctive requirement:273
After [CBA], it is not clear exactly what standard or test, if
any, a non-substantive amendment proposed by initiative must
meet. The Illinois Supreme Court adopted the position of the
Coalition I dissent for initiatives involving substantive issues.
However, the status of the Coalition I majority test for non27 4
substantive proposals is unclear.

Would a proposed amendment to limit the terms of Illinois
legislators satisfy Article XIV, Section 3? This sort of amendment
would impact the eligibility of legislators, the manner and method of
their selection, and certainly matters of seniority and administrative
organization. Term limits would be a change not likely to be initiated
by the legislature and would not be a substantive matter, i.e., one
seeking modification of substantive law or constitutional policy. Thus,
regardless of whether proposed amendments continue to need to
directly impact procedural as well as structural subjects in Article IV,
legislative term limits would seem to be precisely the kind of proposal
suitable for popular initiative under Article XIV.275 The amendment

would probably satisfy the current conjunctive test by meeting the
structural change requirement "and, of necessity, [incidentally affecting] the procedure of the General Assembly," i.e., there most likely
would be "structural" changes and "procedural provisions affected
by changes in the structure. 21 7 6 Consequently, because "basic quali-

ties" of the legislature would be impacted and no substantive matters
are involved, a proposal to limit the terms of Illinois legislators very
well might be held consistent with the Illinois constitution, especially
273. A recent article noted:
[T]he Illinois Supreme Court implicitly sanctioned [the] adoption of the

Coalition I dissent when it relied on the part of the Lousin [v. State Bd. of

Elections, 438 N.E.2d 1241(111. 1982)] decision that followed Justice Schae-

fer['s dissent]. The Illinois Supreme Court then explicitly established Justice
Schaefer's 'no substantive changes' test without noting his rejection of the
requirement that an initiative proposal affect both structural and procedural
aspects of the legislature.

Stephanie R. Williams, Comment, Voter Initiatives in Illinois: Where Are We After
Chicago Bar Association v. State Board of Elections?, 22 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 1119,

1134-35 (1991) (footnotes omitted).
274. Id.at 1137.
275. Id.

276. Lousin, 438 N.E.2d at 1251.
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if the most recent CBA decision is interpreted to support a less rigid
disjunctive reading of the initiative provision.
CONCLUSION

It is difficult to deny that our government is largely in the hands
of career politicians. The Founders of our nation apparently recognized that public officials too long in-office would become abusive
and out of touch with their constituents. Legislators have become so
concerned with the perpetual need to campaign or raise funds that
they appear to be neglecting public policy; and their seniority, official
power, and the large contributions they encourage (or attract) unfairly
and unconstitutionally discourage and restrain those who would challenge them (and those who would vote for challengers).
Term limitations, of course, impact the rights of those who favor
incumbents and seem contrary to the intentions of the framers, who
placed no restrictions on tenure in the Constitution. But term limits
for state legislatures have been found to be a legitimate, narrowly
tailored means of accomplishing the important state interest in protecting and promoting fair elections in a democracy; and the term
provided for legislators during the early Republic originally was
chosen, after all, with the expectation it would ensure a high turnover.
Positive limitation of legislative terms would offer a check on the
evils of prolonged power not too dissimilar from term limitations
thought necessary for the office of president or from those which
have been constitutionally imposed on many state governors. Term
limits would also create in political parties an incentive to regularly
nurture and recruit viable candidates for all political offices, candidates who might provide the ideas necessary to deal with seemingly
intractable problems. Those who continued in office mainly for power,
prestige, and profit would be discouraged; those who actually sought
public service to solve social ills and improve the human condition
would have more opportunity.
At least, the viability of term limits as a solution to presently
perceived problems with state legislatures will be tested. If state
legislatures prove effective notwithstanding term limits, this may
encourage legislative initiatives toward limits in additional states or a
term limitation amendment to the federal constitution. It may even
encourage judicial recognition of state power to limit their federal
legislative delegations. The term limitation movement will become
even more productive when it becomes apparent that term limits do
not unduly disturb the status quo, when local legislatures continue to
be at least as effective as they were before limits (and hopefully more
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so), and when term limitation results in more involved voters in a
reinvigorated democracy.
Illinois has a unique potential to participate in the movement for
legislative term limits through the use of its "limited" constitutional
initiative. Neither the legislative history of the Illinois initiative provision nor the decisions interpreting it seem to present a barrier to
placing a term limitation amendment on the ballot. In fact, term
limitations may be closer than Illinois' legislators presently realize.

